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This paper identifies the unprecedented challenges that the prospects of an ‘ambient intel-
ligence’ era (involving the development of the ‘internet of things’, with wide dissemination of
RFID’s, ubiquitous computing, ‘smart’ objects and surveillance devices) raise from the points of
view of ‘privacy’ and data protection. Privacy and data protection are identified, in line with Agre’s
conceptualization, as complementary and interdependent legal instruments aimed at preserving the
individual freedom to build one’s own personality without excessive constrains and influences, and
to control some aspects of one’s identity that one projects on the world. The ‘performativity’ and
the distribution of agency that characterize AmI systems are exposed as transversal concerns that
threaten the fundamental value grounding both privacy and data protection laws: respect for in-
dividual autonomy. The relevance, applicability and adequacy of the European privacy and data
protection legal frameworks to deal with those unprecedented challenges are then assessed. That
assessment required the rethinking of the scope and the normative grounds of what is meant by
the ‘right to privacy.’ Privacy, it is argued, is an instrument for fostering the specific yet changing
autonomic capabilities of individuals that are, in a given society at a given time, necessary for sus-
taining a vivid democracy. What those needed capabilities are is obviously contingent both on the
characteristics of the constituency considered, and on the state of the technological, economic and
social forces that must be weighed against each other through the operation of legislative balanc-
ing. Capacity for both reflexive autonomy allowing one to resist social pressures to conform with
dominant drifts, and for deliberative abilities allowing one to participate in deliberative processes
are arguably among the skills that a vivid democracy needs citizens to have in the circumstances
∗Part of the research for this paper has been made in the course of the MIAUCE research project
funded by the European Commission. This paper also benefited from discussions held with Yves
Poullet, Christophe Lazaro, Denis Darquennes, Claire Lobet-Maris, Nathalie Grandjean, of the
Information Technology and Law Research Center (CRID) and the Center for Technology As-
sessment (CITA) of the University of Namur, and with Paul De Hert, Mireille Hildebrandt, Serge
Gutwirth, Niels Van Dijk, Katia de Vries and Els Soenens of the Center for Law, Science, Tech-
nology and Society Studies (LSTS) of the Vrije Universitijt Brussel. The author also wishes to
acknowledge the thoughtful suggestions received from the two anonymous reviewers, and the in-
valuable help received from Nancy J. King of Oregon State University, who kindly agreed to read
and improve the linguistic quality of the paper. Remaining mistakes and infelicities remain the
author’s sole responsibility.
of our times. The value of privacy today, it will be argued, resides in the support it provides for in-
dividuals to develop those aptitudes. Acknowledging both the ‘intermediate’ value of privacy, and
its ‘social-structural’ value, the paper aims at clarifying the conceptual intricacies characterizing
privacy and data protection, in view of the emerging challenges raised by the exponential develop-
ment of information and communication technologies on the threshold of an ‘ambient intelligence
era.’ Finally the applicability of the European data protection scheme to the types of data process-
ing involved in Ambient Intelligence, and the compatibility of the technical visions embedded in
those systems with the fundamental data protection principles, are critically explored.






Inherited from a time when the physical world and the digital world (also called, 
somewhat misleadingly, virtual) were clearly distinct from each-other, the utopia 
of freedom in a cyber-space, liberated from both the constraints inherent to the 
physical world and the traditional authorities, does not appear compatible 
anymore with the recent and prospective developments of the information society.  
The separation between the 'digital' and the 'physical' that supported the 
dream of freedom in the digital (disembodied) world happens to be gradually 
contradicted by the increasing inter-penetration of the 'real' and the so-called 
'virtual'. Instead of the free, virtual public space dreamed of in the nineties, the 
Internet has soon been colonized by profit-driven logics and has soon become the 
privileged operating field for marketers, whereas search engine operators now 
“affirmatively control their users’ expériences. »1 
Besides the so-called ‘Internet revolution’, a wealth of technological 
innovations is gradually reconfiguring and blurring the distinction between 
private and public spaces and between physical and digital reality. The 
development and dissemination of RFIDs2 (Radio frequency Identification 
Device) embedded in things (computer mice, goods, clothes, travel documents, 
mobile phones, and even, possibly, human bodies...) and allowing wireless 
retrieval of information stored on them prefigure an 'internet of things' 
communicating and interacting through virtually 'invisible' processes.3 The 
orientation of research towards the development of 'ubiquitous computing', that is, 
of pervasive and invisible information systems allowing constant and automatic 
                                                 
1 See, Eric Goldman, « Search Engine Biases and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism », 
Yale Law Journal of Technology, 2006, 188-200: « Complaints about search engine bias implicitly 
reflect some disappointed expectations.  In theory, search engines can transcend the deficiencies of 
predecessor media to produce a type of media utopia.  In practice, search engines are just like 
every other medium—heavily reliant on editorial control and susceptible to human biases.  This 
fact shatters any illusions of search engine utopianism. »  
2 In its Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of Regions on « Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in 
Europe: steps towards a policy framework » (COM(2007)96 final), the Commission held that 
« Radio frequency identification (RFID) is a technology that allows automatic identification and 
data capture by using radio frequencies. The salient features of this technology are that they permit 
the attachment of a unique identifier and other information – using a micro-chip  to any object, 
animal or even a person, and to read this information through a wireless device. RFIDs are not just 
"electronic tags" or "electronic barcodes". When linked to databases and communications 
networks, such as the Internet, this technology provides a very powerful way of delivering new 
services and applications, in potentially any environment. »  
3 On the development of the RFID technology and its subsequent legal regulation, see Yves 
Poullet, Antoinette Rouvroy, Denis Darquennes, « Le droit à la rencontre des technologies de 
l’information et de la communication : le cas du RFID », Cahiers droits, science et technologie, 
CNRS, 2008, forthcoming.  
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recording of events, open the way to the 'spontaneous' adaptation of the 
environment (ambient intelligence) to the human user's 'needs', inferred from the 
information gathered by a system combining a variety of sensors disseminated in 
the user's environment and processed according to algorithms autonomously 
adapted by the system itself on the basis of the user's constantly refined profile. 
The technological innovations this paper is concerned with are those roughly 
oriented towards a vision of 'ambient intelligence',implying, according to the 
2003European IST Advisory Group's report,« Ambient Intelligence: from vision 
to reality»4that 
“humans will, in an Ambient Intelligent Environment, be surrounded by intelligent 
interfaces supported by computing and networking technology that is embedded in 
everyday objects such as furniture, clothes, vehicles, roads and smart materials - even 
particles of decorative substances like paint. AmI implies a seamless environment of 
computing, advanced networking technology and specific interfaces. This environment 
should be aware of the specific characteristics of human presence and personalities; adapt 
to the needs of users; be capable of responding intelligently to spoken or gestured 
indications of desire; and even result in systems that are capable of engaging in intelligent 
dialogue. Ambient Intelligence should also be unobtrusive - interaction should be 
relaxing and enjoyable for the citizen, and not involve a steep learning curve. » 
Such a 'vision' requires 
« a real time adaptive environment in which most adaptive decisions are taken by 
machines in a process of machine to machine communication. These decisions are based 
on what is called autonomic profiling, severely restricting human intervention, while 
being in need of a continuous and dynamic flow of information. »5 
Although ambient intelligence, still in its infancy, is merely a “vision” 
today, recent technological advances have resolutely placed us on the path 
towards the realisation of that vision. The intensification of data mining6 and 
profiling on the web and elsewhere, aimed at predicting individual behaviours and 
preferences with more accuracy and impartiality than allowed by human 
                                                 
4 IST Advisory Group's report,« Ambient Intelligence: from vision to reality.  For  participation  in 
society & business », 2003. ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/ist/docs/istag-
ist2003_consolidated_report.pdf 
5 European Network of Excellence FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society)’s study 
on “Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Profiling, and Ambient Intelligence (AmI)”, 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-del7.7.RFID_Profiling_AMI.pdf 
6 “Data mining” can be defined as a set of operations carried following the statistical method with 
the aim of establishing, with a certain margin of errors, correlations between specific observable 
factors. The result is a method of classification of individuals on the basis of observable factors, 
allowing the prediction of other, not directly observable, facts. See Jean-Marc Dinant, Christophe 
Lazaro, Yves Poullet, Nathalie Lefever, Antoinette Rouvroy, “L'application de la Convention 108 
au mécanisme de profilage”, Report for the Council of Europe, 2008. 
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adjudication; the mushrooming of 'intelligent' cctv7 able to detect specific patterns 
of the environment, to admonish people exhibiting 'improper' behaviours in both 
public and private spaces, assisting security guards, the police and law 
enforcement officials in their tasks of prevention and detection of crime and 
incivilities; the gradual dissemination of radio frequency identification technology 
(RFID) in the commercial, health, and security sectors, allowing wireless distant 
retrieval of information contained on the RFID tags embedded in goods, clothes, 
or even human bodies; the perspective of physiological and emotional monitoring 
of employees through systems, such as the one recently developed by Microsoft, 
which would allow managers to monitor employees' performance through 
wireless sensors that could read “heart rate, galvanic skin response, EMG, brain 
signals, respiration rate, body temperature, facial movements, facial expressions 
and blood pressure”8 are all contributing to reconfigure human experience, and to 
change the terms through which one ought to think of power relations in society 
and of legal balancing of stakeholders' interests. These economic, technological 
and socio-political developments are transforming the human space into a 
globalized, mixed digital and physical space, in which the automatic collection, 
analysis and mining of information about people, objects, places and contexts 
may well threaten citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties.  
The question of how the law should intervene to guarantee that 
technological progress does not result in violations of fundamental rights and 
fundamental freedoms has been with us for a long time. Any possible answer that 
may be suggested at a given moment is unavoidably rooted in specific and 
fluctuating political, technological and cultural assumptions. The aim of this paper 
is to assess the relevance, applicability and adequacy of existing European privacy 
and data protection legal frameworks to deal with the unprecedented challenges 
carried by the technical visions and the potential industrial application scenarios 
involved in the current research and development projects in the field of “ambient 
intelligence”. The unprecedented challenges all relate to the unequaled, 
‘normative’ character of these new technologies9: the new information, 
                                                 
7 ‘Intelligent cctv’, resulting from the growing convergence of previously separated technologies, 
leading to the production and dissemination of artifacts combining video cameras with facial 
recognition softwares, ‘talking’ cameras able to admonise individuals whose behaviours are 
interpreted as dangerous, suspicious, socially inacceptable or criminal.  
8 For a description of the technological dispositive developped by Microsoft and called  




9 See Bert-Jaap Koops, « Criteria for Normative Technology. An essay on the acceptability of 
'code as law' in light of democratic and cosntitutional values. », TILT Law & Technology Working 
Paper, N. 005/2007; Tilburg University Legal Studies Working Paper N. 007/2007: « Technology 
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communication and networking dispositives, converging in ubiquitous computing 
and ambient intelligence technologies that do not merely offer individuals new 
tools that potentially reconfigure human experience, they may also, more 
fundamentally interfere with the process through which individuals come to build 
their own personality. In other words, they may affect what Foucault called the 
process of 'subjectivation', which 
« enables us to become subjects of these true discourses, which enables us to become the 
subject who tells the truth and who is transgured by this enunciation of the truth, by this 
enunciation itself, precisely by the fact of telling the truth. »10 
I believe the core ethical and legal question conveyed by the announced 
'ambient intelligence era' is, precisely : how should the law preserve the essential 
conditions for individual reflexive autonomy and self determination against the 
very strong incentives for anticipative conformity ensuing from constant 
observation, monitoring and profiling on the one hand, and against the 'dilution' of 
human agency engendered by the substitution of patterns of distributed 
intentionality to the present configuration in which human beings, are the 
exclusive holders of intentionality.  
The question this paper aims to address is wether privacy and data 
protection regimes may have a role to play in preserving human subjectivation in 
the still virtual  circumstances announced by the 'visions' of ambient intelligence. 
Philip Agre grasped much of the relation between data protection and 
privacy in a simple sentence:   
“. . . control over personal information is control over an aspect of the identity one 
projects to the world, and the right to privacy is the freedom from unreasonable 
constraints on the construction of one's own identity.”11 
These two aspects – freedom from unreasonable constraints (from the state 
or from others) on the construction of one’s identity, and control over (some) 
aspects of the identity one projects to the world – are at the heart of the most 
crucial concerns arising when considering, from a legal and political point-of-
view, the emerging AmI scenarios.  Concerns for privacy and data protection in 
the advanced information society and with regards to the nascent ‘ambient 
                                                                                                                                     
has always had a certain normative element – it is never neutral. However, since a decade or two, 
something is changing. With the advent of information and communication technologies (ICT) 
and the Internet, technology is being used more and more intentionally as an instrument to 
regulate human behaviour. » 
10 Michel Foucault, L'herméneutique du sujet, Cours du collège de France, 3 Mars 1982, 
Gallimard, Seuil. 
11 Philip E. Agre, Marc Rotenberg (eds.), Technology and Privacy. The New Landscape, MIT 
Press, 1998, p. 3. 
4




intelligence revolution’ have been widely reflected in the literature12, in opinions 
of consultative bodies13 and in various research reports on ethical, legal and social 
issues raised by current visions of AmI.14 One obvious reason for this is the fact 
                                                 
12 A comprehensive list of references would be interminable. Among the most famous references 
are Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace Basic Books, 1999; Jeffrey Rosen, The 
Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age, Random House Trade 
Paperback, 2005; Daniel Solove, Marc Rotenberg, and Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Information 
and Technology,  Aspen Publishers, 2006; Daniel Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and 
Privacy in the Information Age, NYU Press, 2006. Papers include, for example, see Paul M. 
Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s Code for internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and 
Fair Information Practices”, Wisconsin Law Review, 2000, 743-788; Friedewald, M., 
Vildjiounaite, E., Punie, Y., & Wright, D. (2007). “Privacy, identity and security in ambient 
intelligence: A scenario analysis.” Telematics and Informatics. 24(1), 15; Yves Poullet and Jean-
Marc Dinant, “The internet and private life in Europe: Risks and aspirations”. In New Dimentions 
of Privacy Law, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 60-90; Helen Nissenbaum, “Protecting 
Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public”, Law and Philosophy, 17, 
1998; Lisa Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology”, Law and Philosophy, 22, 2003, pp. 
119-199-166. 
13 Of particular relevance, at the European level, are the opinions delivered by the Working Party 
on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data set up by article 29 
of the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995. See 
in particular the Working document on data protection issues related to RFID technology, WP 
105, of 19th January 2005, 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf ; the Opinion on the 
concept of personal data, WP 136 of 20th June 2007,  
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf - ; the Results of the 
Public Consultation on Article 29 Working Document 105 on Data Protection Issues Related to 
RFID Technology, of 28th June 2005,  
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp111_en.pdf - ; the Opinion 5/2004 on 
unsolicited communications for marketing purposes under Article 13 of Directive 2002/58/EC, 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp90_en.pdf - ; Opinion on the 
Processing of Personal Data by means of Video Surveillance of 11th February 2004.  The 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)’s recent Opinion on 
videosurveillance in public places by public authorities and the protection of Human Rights, of 23 
March 2007 (Study No. 404/2006), CDL-AD(2007)014,  
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)014-e.pdf is also marginally interesting for 
our purpose, as the study explicitly excludes legal issues arising from the video surveillance of 
private areas such as banks, casinos, stores, private residential areas. In the United States, the 2007 
Guidelines for Public Videosurveillance: A guide to Protecting Communities and Preserving Civil 
Liberties, a Report by the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee, 
www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Video_surveillance_guidelines.pdf,  provides particularly useful 
information and reflections. 
14 Of particular relevance are the TAUCIS (Technology Assessment of Ubiquitous Computing and 
Informational Self-Determination) project, funded by the German Federal Ministery for Education 
and Research, http://www.taucis.hu-berlin.de/content/de/ueberblick/english.php, the European 
Network of Excellence FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information Society)’s study on “Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID), Profiling, and Ambient Intelligence (AmI)”, 
http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-del7.7.RFID_Profiling_AMI.pdf, the 
5
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that the most essential ingredient, so to speak, of envisioned AmI systems, is 
information about ‘users’.15 The unavoidable cost of entering in an AmI world, 
and the very condition of possibility of such a world, appears to be the loss of 
control over personal information: the constitutive ideas of AmI, such as 
pervasiveness, invisibility of information systems, constant and automatic 
recording of events etc. render highly implausible that the user will retain control 
over what and how information is processed.  But the reasons that privacy issues 
are so vividly debated on threshold of an ‘AmI era’ go well beyond these 
important concerns for control over personal information (data protection). 
The fact is that the visions behind AmI technologies may appear 
incompatible with the major importance that Western societies place in cultivating 
and preserving both individual autonomy (freedom from unreasonable constraints 
on the construction of one's own identity16) and political autonomy (a vivid 
democracy where a condition for rules and norms to appear ‘just’ is that they 
result from democratic deliberation among citizens endowed with individual 
deliberative autonomy). Why not discuss individual autonomy right away then? 
Our answer is that, as such, individual autonomy is not a right but an individual 
capability that is always a matter of degree. The conditions for individual 
autonomy are so diverse, so subjective in a sense, that no law could really ensure 
the genuine effectuation of a ‘right to autonomy’.17 Individual autonomy is a stage 
in the development of a person that she should strive to attain. Individual 
autonomy, not more than musical talent, artistic gifts, of happiness, is not 
something that the State, through the law, could ever ‘provide’ to individuals. 
                                                                                                                                     
SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) project, 
http://swami.jrc.es/pages/index.htm identifying privacy, identity, security, trust and the digital 
divide as the main (social, ethical and legal) challenges raised by AmI. Also of interest is the 
commencing PRIAM (privacy issues in ambient intelligence) project funded by the French 
INRIA.http://priam.citi.insa-
lyon.fr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26 
15 We will come back later on the highly ambiguous concept of ‘user’. 
16 The importance of a private sphere where the individual could enjoy ‘insulation’ has been 
famously acknowledged by John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty, (Cambridge University Press, 1989 
[1859], pp. 8-9), where he suggests that such insulation may be necessary in order to avoid the 
‘tyranny of the majority’: “there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion 
and feeling, against the tendency of a society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its 
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the 
development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its 
ways, and to compel all characters and fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a 
limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: and to find 
that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of human 
affairs, as protection against political despotism.”  
17 Considering the ‘right to autonomy’ as a fundamental human right would require justification 
for any restriction on that ‘right’ imposed by the parents to their child. 
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That is the reason why the “right to be autonomous” does not exist as such in the 
law.  
However, despite the law’s inability to ‘create’ or ‘guarantee’ individual 
autonomy, showing respect for individual autonomy18, and, as far as possible, 
providing the conditions necessary for individuals to develop their capacity for 
individual deliberative autonomy (the individual process of self-governance) and 
for collective deliberative democracy (the group-oriented process for critical 
discourse indispensable to a vivid democracy)19 have become the most 
fundamental and basic ethical and legal imperatives in contemporary western 
societies, where respecting these imperatives is perceived as a precondition to the 
legality and legitimacy of the law. Individual autonomy and deliberative 
democracy presuppose a series of rights and liberties allowing individuals to live 
a life characterized as (in part at least) self-determined, self-authored or self-
created, following plans and ideals - a conception of the good - that they have 
chosen for themselves.20 Among these fundamental rights and liberties, the right 
                                                 
18 Respect for individual autonomy of persons, and thus for the choices they make, is contingent, 
in law, to the consideration that the subject is indeed autonomous in the choices he or she makes. 
That condition of autonomy implies the absence of either physical, mental or economic coercion. 
Legal interference with lawful, fully conscious and uncoerced choices of capable individuals is 
considered unacceptable, even if interference arises for the sake of the subject’s own good, in 
which case one speaks of unacceptable legal paternalism. 
19 The inspiration for the link between private and public autonomy (the idea that they are ‘co-
originated’ or mutually productive of each-other) is to be found in Jürgen Habermas’s discourse 
theory of law (especially in Between Facts and Norms, MIT Press, 1996) according to which “Just 
those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could agree as participants in 
rational discourses”. One could interpret as an application of this thesis of the co-origination thesis 
the defense of privacy on the ground of its structural value for society to be read, for example, in 
Paul M. Schwartz, and  William M. Treanor, “The New Privacy”, Michigan Law Review, 101, 
2003, p.216. On deliberative autonomy, see James E. Flemming, “Securing Deliberative 
Autonomy”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, N.1, 1995, pp. 1-71, arguing that the bedrock structure 
of deliberative autonomy secures basic liberties that are significant preconditions for persons’ 
ability to deliberate about and make certain fundamental decisions affecting their destiny, identity, 
or way of life. On deliberative democracy, see James E. Flemming, “Securing Deliberative 
Democracy”, Fordham Law Review, Vol. 72, p. 1435, 2004. Endorsing the concept of a co-
originality of private and public autonomy as developed by Jürgen Habermas in Between Facts 
and Norms. On the concept of co-originality, see Rainer Nickel, “Jürgen Habermas’ concept of co-
originality in times of globaliation and the militant security state”, IUE Working Paper Law, 
2006/27.  
20 See Onora O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Gifford Lectures, 2001), Cambridge 
University Press, 2002, recalling the wide variety of notions that have been associated to the 
concept of autonomy by scholars such as Gerald Dworkin (The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), listing liberty (positive or negative), dignity, integrity, 
individuality, independence, responsibility and self-knowledge, self-assertion, critical reflection, 
freedom from obligation, absence of external causation, and knowledge of one's own interest as 
concepts that have been equated to the concept of autonomy, or as Ruth Faiden and Thomas 
7
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to individual privacy, understood not merely as a right to be left alone but also as 
a right to self-determination disallowing paternalism from the state, and the right 
to data protection empowering individuals with means to control  the collection, 
use and disclosure of personal information, on the assumption that lacking such 
control would subject these individuals to the unbalanced power of others (public 
authorities or private agents), function as the closest legal ‘proxies’ to the moral 
concept of autonomy. As ‘proxies’ for the legally unattainable moral ideal of 
autonomy, privacy and data protection are thus often perceived as the most 
efficient and direct legal instruments to protect individual autonomy on the 
threshold of a predicted ‘AmI era’.  
Acknowledgements of the right to privacy as “autonomy in the 
construction of one’s identity” are explicit in the European human rights 
framework (this is not the case in the United States where the right to privacy has 
no explicit written constitutional basis except in the context of government 
intrusions, through the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and 
seisures of the fourth Amendment to the US Constitution). Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on the right to respect for private and 
family life acknowledging that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
The right to privacy protects individuals against invasions of privacy by 
public authorities or, through the Convention’s horizontal effect, by other 
individuals,21 and has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as 
                                                                                                                                     
Beauchamps, A History and Theory of Informed Consent, Oxford University Press, 1986, 
according to whom autonomy may also be defined as privacy, voluntariness, self-mastery, 
choosing freely, choosing one's own moral position and accepting responsibility for one's choices.  
21 Since the 1981 judgement in Young, James and Webster v. United Kingdom (Eur.Ct.H.R., 13 
August 1981, Series A No.44) the European Court on Human Rights acknowledges an horizontal 
effect to the Convention, extending the scope of protections to relations between private parties: 
§49: ‘Although the proximate cause of the events giving rise to this case was [an agreement 
between an employer and trade unions], it was the domestic law in force at the relevant time that 
made lawful the treatment of which the applicants complained. The responsibility of the 
respondent State for any resultant breach of the Convention is thus engaged on this basis.’ 
Through this horizontal effect of the Convention, the fundamental rights seem to gain positive 
effectiveness. The matter is highly controversial, however, just as controversial as the question of 
the conception of privacy either as a mere privilege or as a (subjective) right. See also  X and Y v. 
Netherlands, 8978/80 (1985) ECHR 4 (26 March 1985), Series A, vol. 91: ‘although the object of 
8




including the individual right to control personal information, including in the 
workplace22 (the scope of the right to privacy and of the right to data protection 
may intersect with regards to ‘informational privacy’), the right to physical and 
moral integrity including regarding sexual life,23 the right to access one’s personal 
records,24 the right to establish and maintain personal and social life,25 to establish 
and develop relationships with other human beings,26 etc. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union27, reproduces, 
in its Article 7,  §1 of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights to 
private and family life:« Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications. » 
Article 8 of the Charter raises the protection of personal data to the status of a 
fundamental right: 
                                                                                                                                     
Article 8 (art. 8) is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the 
public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in 
addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an 
effective respect for private or family life (see the Airey judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 
32, p. 17, para. 32). These obligations may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure 
respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves.’ 
22 See the recent decision by the European Court on Human Rights, in Copland v. United 
Kingdom, 62617/00 [2007] ECHR 253 (3 April 2007), in which the Court held that monitoring of 
an employee’s emails, internet usage and telephone calls had breached the employee’s right to 
privacy. The Court held that even monitoring the date and length of telephone conversations and 
the number dialed could give rise to a breach of privacy. The arguments of the court included the 
fact that the employee had not been informed that her telephone calls might be subject to 
monitoring, and that, at the time, no law exited in the UK that allowed employers to monitor their 
employees communications. Indeed, the Regulation of Investigatory Power Act of 2000 was not 
yet in force at that time. The Court does not investigate whether that Act might be inconsistent 
with the Human Rights Act however. 
23 X and Y v. Netherlands, 8978/80 (1985) ECHR 4 (26 March 1985), Series A, vol. 91. 
24 Gaskin v. United Kingdom, 10454/83 (1989 ECHR 13 (7 July 1989) Series A no. 160. See also 
Odièvre v. France, 42326/98 (2003) ECHR 86 (13 February 2003), where the ECHR 
acknowledged that the right to privacy (Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights) 
protects, among other interests, the right to personal development, and that matters relevant to 
personal development included details of a person’s identity as a human being and the vital 
interest in obtaining information necessary to discover the truth concerning important aspects of 
one’s personal identity.  
25 Beldjoudi v. France, 12084/86 (1992) ECHR 42 (29 March 1992). 
26 Niemietz v. Germany, 13710/88 ECHR 80 (18 December 1992) Series 1, vol. 251 B.: ‘The 
Court does not consider it possible or necessary to attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion 
of "private life". However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an "inner circle" in 
which the individual may live his own personal life as he or she chooses and to exclude there from 
entirely the outside world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life must also 
comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings.’ 
27 2000/C 364/01. 
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1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, 
and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority. 
The fundamental principles of data protection (fair processing, performed 
for specific purpose, on the basis of the subject’s consent or on other legitimate 
basis laid down by law, subjective rights of the data subject to access and rectify 
collected data) has been formalized in the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of the Council 
of Europe,28 and reiterated in the fair information principles formalised in the 
European directive on the protection of individuals with regards to the automatic 
processing of personal data29 and in the European directive concerning the 
processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communication sector.30 
The European legal framework of data protection’s major instruments are 
essentially these two important directives : the Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data31, and the Directive 2002/58/EC EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2002 concerning the processing of 
personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communication 
sector.32 Data protection principles apply to the processing of “personal data” that 
the directives define as: “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person”. Except when the data is anonymous or anonymized, any 
collection, storage and use of coded or personal data relating to human subjects 
must comply with the 1995/46/EC Directive onthe protection of individuals with 
                                                 
28 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data of the Council of Europe, ETS No. 108, Strasbourg, 28 January 1981.  
29 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, Official Journal L 281, 23 November 1995. 
30 European Directive 2002/58/EC EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 
2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communication sector. 
31 Official Journal L 281, 23 November 1995.  
32 Official Journal L 201, 31 July 2002. See also the Directive 2006/24/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communication services or of public 
communications networks and amending the Directive 2002/58/EC, Official JournalL 105, 14 
April 2006 P. 0054-0063. 
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regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. 
When, in addition, that information is about the user’s communications on the 
internet, the Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on 
privacy and electronic communications) applies.  
The right to privacy (acknowledged in Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and taken over in Article 7 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union) and the right to data protection 
acknowledged at Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, and implemented by the two Data protection directives) interact in a 
variety of ways. The European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that 
“informational privacy” is among what Article 8 of the ECHR protects. In this 
regard, data protection directives are among the tools through which the 
individual exercises his right to privacy. More generally, having the guarantee 
that personal information (personal data) will not be collected and used in 
manners that totally escape from the individual’s control is indeed a precondition 
for the individual to feel genuinely free from unreasonable constraints on the 
construction of his identity. Yet, data protection is also a tool for protecting rights 
other than the right to privacy. Because the data protection directive prevents the 
processing of information relating to the individual’s racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and 
concerning the individual’s health or sexual life, it prevents potential 
discriminations on these grounds. On the other hand, the right to privacy is 
irreducible to the right to data protection: it guarantees the inviolability of the 
home (spatial privacy) ; has to do with the inviolability of the human body ; and 
protects the individual’s emotions and relationships with others. We will come 
back to those different aspects of privacy later. It is sufficient for now to 
acknowledge that what privacy protects is irreducible to personal information. 
Privacy and data protection intersect but are also different tools for enabling 
individual deliberative autonomy, and, as such, privacy is a precondition to the 
advent of collective deliberative democracy.  
Assessing the requirements that privacy and data protection instruments 
impose on the design and applications of AmI projects, and identifying the 
potential inadequacies of the legal framework will be the object of the second 
section of this paper (Section II). However, some detours are needed as 
preliminary to these assessments. As privacy and data protection are grounded on 
the moral imperatives of individual deliberative autonomy and collective 
deliberative democracy, a precondition to our study of the relevance, applicability 
and adequacy of legal privacy and data protections in Europe is to identify what, 
in AmI projects, threatens those fundamental ‘autonomic’ and ‘democratic’ values 
that privacy and data protection are meant to protect. As ‘transversal issues’ 
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(Section I), we have identified two main matters in this regard, which are 
respectively the ‘performative’ power of the classifications operated by the 
information systems (I.1), and the increasingly distributed human-objects agency 
(I.2). Taking these issues seriously, we will argue, requires the development of 
value-sensitive design or, more precisely, of democracy-sensitive design. Beyond 
privacy-enhancing technologies, democracy-sensitive design should ensure that 
socio-technological configurations both result from democratic deliberation, and 
increase democratic participation and inclusion (I.3). 
 
SECTION I - TRANSVERSAL ISSUES: ARE AMI SYSTEMS COMPATIBLE WITH 
PRIVACY AS “FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE CONSTRAINS IN THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF ONE’S IDENTITY”? 
 
The focus of the present section is on how AmI systems, due to their 
‘performative’ power on the one hand, and to the character of distributed agency 
they exhibit on the other hand,  may interfere with the “free development of one’s 
personality”, requiring a certain level of immunity from constrains in the 
construction of one’s identity.33 
 
I.1 – Freedom from unreasonable constraints in the construction of one’s 
identity and the ‘making of people’ in AmI systems. 
 
Combined with the ever increasing technological capacities to track, record, 
analyse, correlate and interpret images, sounds and texts transpiring from human 
activity and context34 (through the tracking, recording and analysis of information 
voluntarily or involuntarily ‘released’ by the ‘users’, such as eye fixation, body 
movements, facial expressions and internet transactions, for example), AmI 
visions rely on systems capable of ‘learning’ from occurring events and 
incrementally self-adjusting to respond optimally to human ‘needs’ whereas these 
‘needs’, are decreasingly defined by the concerned ‘users’ themselves, but 
increasingly defined according to the system’s interpretations of whatever 
happens in the contexts, and of whatever users do or even, increasingly, of what 
their facial expressions and body motions are. To that extent, one may say that 
AmI technologies not only rely on the automatic and systematic processing of 
                                                 
33 Samuel D.Warren and Loouis D. Brandeis explicitly grounded their conception of the “right to 
privacy” on the peace of mind such a right should allow, and on what they identified as the 
principle of “inviolate personality”, which, according to them, was part of a general right of 
immunity of the person, “the right to one's personality” (Samuel D. Warren,  Louis D. Brandeis, 
“The Right to Privacy”, Harv. L. Rev. 1890, p. 195 and 215.) 
34 Computing, communication and storage capabilities are said to be doubling every eighteen, six 
and nine months respectively. (Thomas Skordas and George Metakides, “Major Challenges in 
Ambient Intelligence”, Studies in Informatics and Control, 12(2), June 2003.) 
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personal information, but that they ‘construct’ and ‘produce’ knowledge about 
their ‘users’.35 
The type of knowledge so produced is in no way ‘objective’ as one has 
long been able to speak of the ‘objectivity’ of scientific knowledge. Said 
otherwise, the information systems involved in AmI visions are not intended to 
“observe” the unique complexity of each individual human being, but to sort 
individuals in a variety of heterogeneous categories for the purpose of predicting 
either their willingness to buy specified commodities, their risk to fill claims with 
health and disability insurances, the danger they represent for others, or other 
propensities that marketers, insurers, law enforcement officials and many others 
will find useful to have. Ian Hacking recently expressed concern with regards to 
classification of people, which is highly relevant to the assessment of the 
scenarios envisioned in the field of AmI:  when people are taken as objects of 
scientific or bureaucratic inquiry for a variety of purposes going from controlling 
to helping them, passing by, organizing them or keeping them away from places, 
such classifications affect the people classified, and the affects on the people, in 
turn, change the classifications: 
“We think of these kinds of people as definite classes defined by definite properties. As 
we get to know more about these properties, we will be able to control, help, change, or 
emulate them better. But it’s not quite like that. They are moving targets because our 
investigations interact with them, and change them. And since they are changed, they are 
not quite the same kind of people as before. The target has moved. I call this the ‘looping 
effect’. Sometimes, our sciences create kinds of people that in a certain sense did not 
exist before. I call this ‘making up people’”.36 
This ‘making up of people’ in AmI projects is contingent on the type of 
finalities and applications of the systems. These finalities and applications are 
diverse, and very difficult to predict in advance, and will arguably be different 
depending whether the envisioned applications (or scenarios) involve either the 
“automatic” display of information optimized to the user’s needs or preferences as 
interpreted by the system (e.g. in marketing or interactive web-TV scenarios ), or 
the “automatic” initiation of security measures adapted to the system’s 
interpretation of the events occurring in the environment it captures (e.g. in 
intelligent video surveillance scenario, with cameras equipped with technologies 
allowing motion detection, automated tracking, …).  
The concerns here are not merely about the increased “visibility” of 
individual existences in their most tiny details (a concern which was the focus of 
                                                 
35 The most obvious example of such constructions are the profiles produced through data mining. 
See Bart Custers, The Power of Knowledge. Ethical, Legal, and technological Aspects of Data 
Mining and Group Profiling in Epidemiology. Wolf Legal Publishers, 2004. 
36 Ian Hacking, “Making Up People”, London Review of Books, 26(16), 17 August 2007. 
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the traditional conceptions of privacy)37, but also about the possibility that 
meaning be ascribed to even the most trivial and fugitive image, sound or 
movement captured from individuals. The engines involved in AmI scenario are 
engines of ‘discovery’ or of ‘observation’, but also engines for ‘making up’ 
people.38 The probable impacts of AmI scenarios consist less in discovering and 
characterising what is pre-existing than it in creating new interactions and 
behaviours involving subjects, objects, and (public and private) organizations, 
and, through an elaborated interplay of statistics and correlations, in producing, 
or, more probably, reinforcing the norms, the criteria of normality and desirability 
against which individual lifestyles, preferences, choices and behaviours will be 
evaluated, with gratifications for compliant individuals, and sanctions for deviant 
ones, in the form of increased surveillance and monitoring, or of a reduction of 
access to specific places, goods, services, activities or other opportunities.39 
The central importance of privacy and data protection in the context of 
AmI  is thus not merely due to the fact that AmI systems record what happens in 
‘real life’. What is crucial here is that these systems constructor produce the 
meaning of those events and, on that basis, frame the user’s environment in ways 
that in turn impact on his self-perception, choices, preferences and behaviours, 
interfering, potentially at the deepest level, with the effective exercise by 
individuals of their capacity forself-determination, and with their effective 
political capacity to participate in the discursive processes of deliberative 
democracy that should guarantee the justiciability of those classifications.40 
                                                 
37 The recent American “Guidelines for Public Video Surveillance” suggested by the Constitution 
Project’s Liberty and Security Committee (2007) acknowledge that “technological advances and 
social changes have ushered in new and more pervasive forms of public video surveillance with 
the potential to upset the existing balance between law enforcement needs and constitutional rights 
and values. Modern public video surveillance systems consist of networks of linked cameras 
spread over vast portions of public space. These cameras can be equipped with technologies like 
high resolution and magnification, motion detection, infrared vision, and biometric identification – 




38 See Ian Hacking, “Making Up People”, London Review of Books,, 17 August 2006, p. 23, where 
he develops a parallel reflexion, not about AmI technologies, but about humans sciences (many 
social sciences, psychology, psychiatry and a good deal of clinical medicine). 
39 « Things have changed since Orwell’s time, and consumption for the masses has emerged as the 
new inclusionary reality. Only the minority, the so-called underclass, whose position prevents 
them from participating freely in consumption, now experience the hard edge of exclusionary and 
punitive surveillance.” (David Lyon, The Electronic Eye: the Rise of Surveillance Society, 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994.)  
40 On the idea that ‘profiles’ should be made ‘justiciable’, see Mireille Hildebrandt, “Profiles and 
Correlatable Humans”, in: Christoff Henning, Nico Stehr and Bernd Weiler (eds.), Knowledge and 
the Law. Can Knowledge be Made Just?, New Jersey: Transaction Books 2007.: “If the 
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Needless to say, to the extent that these classifications condition access or denial 
of access to valuable opportunities in life, they should result from a democratic 
deliberative process. Recalling how Lewis Mumfort, back in 1964, characterized 
democracy may well provide useful inspiration in the circumstances of our times:  
“Democracy consists in giving final authority to the whole, rather than to the part; and 
only living human beings, as such, are an authentic expression of the whole, whether 
acting alone or with the help of others. Around this central principle clusters a group of 
related ideas and practices (...). Among these items are communal self-government, free 
communication as between equals, unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, 
protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of individual moral 
responsibility for behavior that affects the whole community. All living organisms are in 
some degree autonomous, in that they follow a life-pattern of their own; but in man this 
autonomy is an essential condition for his further development. We surrender some of our 
autonomy when ill or crippled, but to surrender it everyday on every occasion would be 
to turn life itself into a chronic illness. The best life possible (...) is one that calls for an 
ever greater degree of self-direction, self-expression, and self-realization. In this sense, 
personality, once the exclusive attribute of kings, belongs on democratic theory to every 
man. Life in its fullness and wholeness cannot be delegated.”41 
At a time where respect for individual autonomy has become the most 
fundamental and basic ethical and legal imperative, the truly “poïetic” nature of 
AmI visions is problematic. The “performativity” of the knowledge constructed 
about users on the basis of correlated data transforms the subjects about whom 
that knowledge is constructed. From there on, the user's position as « subject » 
becomes prone to turn into a position as « object ». 
A word of caution is needed about the concept of user, which is very 
common in the literature about ambient intelligence and ubiquitous computing, 
but has never received any thorough definition. It is usually employed to 
designate the persons about whom information is recorded and processed. They 
may be ordinary civilians in security scenarios, they may be customers in 
marketing scenarios,… from the point-of-view of data protection, they would be 
called the ‘data subjects’, but the reseachers and industrials involved in the 
development and promotion of AmI appear reluctant to use the term ‘subjects’. 
The same reluctance has appeared in the context of biomedical research where 
“the research community is slowly beginning to change the language of 
involvement in biomedical research by patients and the general public. Research 
                                                                                                                                     
knowledge produced by profiling practices entails exclusion, stigmatisation, confrontation, 
customisation and even de-individualisation, the question is how to constrain these practices in 
order to make the knowledge they produce just.” 
41 Lewis Mumford, « Authoritarian and Democratic Technics », Technology and Culture, 5(1), 
1964, 1-8. 
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‘subjects’ have become research ‘participants’”.42 In the AmI context, the 
terminological ambiguity attests of the ambivalence of technological 
developments which assist people in their daily activities, increasing their 
performance, enhancing their security in given environments and spaces, while 
also ‘producing’ truly new spaces, called by some ‘performative’ or ‘surveillance 
spaces’, and, arguably, new ‘users’ as well.43 
What conditions would guarantee the ‘autonomous’ character of expressed 
choices and consents in a performative surveillance space where citizens 
systematically adapt their behaviours to what is expected from them, where, on 
the basis of what they have read, or chosen in the past, one-to-one marketing 
filters the information and offers communicated to them about goods and services 
available for purchase, thereby confirming them in their ‘profile’, where, in other 
words, they are themselves constituted as subjects through their active 
participation to the system they are asked to consent to? When individual desires, 
preferences, and choices are always already framed by the technology, when, in 
other words, no elsewhere exists from where individuals could contest what is 
proposed or imposed on them through the AmI technologies, how can individual 
autonomy be preserved?  
 
I.2 – Freedom from unreasonable constraints in the construction of one’s 
identity in a context of distributed agency. 
 
The trope of the ‘user’ may thus be somewhat misgiving to the extent that it 
conveys the idea of active agency. Although AmI systems are mostly described as 
‘human centred’, as ‘reactive’ to human choices, actions and needs, and as 
oriented towards empowering ‘users’ by increasing convenience and 
entertainment for them, sparing them time and costs, increasing their safety and 
security, the vocation of AmI systems is to be seamless and disappear from 
human consciousness, thereby bypassing users’ intentionality and control, 
relieving individuals from making decisions and performing certain actions.  
To the extent that users are free to use the intelligent interface, they are in 
part pre-defined in their choices and preferences by the design of technology. 
“Objects make subjects”, Lucy Suchman44 recently explained, elaborating on the 
theme developed previously by Madeleine Akrish:  
                                                 
42 Alastair V. Campbell, “The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding Altruism 
and Trust”, King’s Law Journal, 2007, 18, pp. 227-245: 241. 
43 John E. McGrath, Loving Big Brother: Performance, Privacy, and Surveillance Space, 
Routledge, 2004. See also, Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, Blackwell, 1991. 
44 Lucy Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations : Plans and Situated Actions, Cambridge 
University Press, 2d.ed., 2006. 
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«Designers define actors with specific tastes, competences, motives, aspirations, political 
prejudices, and the rest, and they assume that morality, technology, science and economy 
will evolve in particular ways. A large part of the work of innovators is that of inscribing 
this vision of (or prediction about) the world in the technical content of the new object. I 
will call the end product of this work a ‘script’ or a ‘scenario.’”45 
And the ‘vision of the world’ in contemporary Europe carries a wealth of 
unchallenged assumptions, such as that carried by the ‘security imperative’ and 
the ‘efficiency imperative’ on which we will return later on. Suffice to say, for 
now, that the embodiment of these imperatives in the design of technology tends 
to insulate them from public debates and possible contestation. This may be seen 
as an interference with the ideal of deliberative democracy. 
Design may also interfere with individual deliberative autonomy. Framing 
the concept of ‘technical paternalism’, Spiekerman and Pallas46 suggested that it 
differs from human paternalism in two important ways. First, machines react 
automatically and autonomously, which leaves users little room for anticipation or 
reaction. Second, technology paternalism is not a matter of obedience as it is the 
case with human interfaces. Instead it is a matter of total compliance, as, by their 
‘coded’ rules, machines can become ‘absolute’ forces and therefore may not be 
overrulable anymore (Spiekerman and Pallas provide the example of sensors in a 
car detecting alcohol on someone’s breath, and  preventing the car from starting, 
even in cases of emergency), as, “in a world of Ubicomp, most decisions are 
performed in the background and are often neither noticed nor can they be 
reviewed or overruled constantly.”  Notice of action, which would be necessary 
for allowing users to overrule decisions made by the machine, indeed appears to 
contradict the ‘calmness’ of ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence. 
IBM’s vision of ‘autonomic computing’47 radicalizes the idea of non-
human agency or of ‘cooperating objects’ through a systemic view of computing 
modelled after a self-regulating biological system, that would ‘know itself’, 
comprising components that also possess a system identity, be able to configure 
and reconfigure itself under varying and unpredictable conditions, would always 
look for ways to optimize its workings, would be able to recover from routine and 
extraordinary events that might cause some of its parts to malfunction, would be 
able to protect itself, would know its environment and the context surrounding its 
activity, and adapt its actions accordingly, would exist with and implement open 
standards, and would anticipate the optimized resources needed while keeping its 
complexity hidden.  
                                                 
45 Madeline Akrich, “The De-Scription of Technological Objects”, in. W.E. Bijker and J. Law, 
Shaping Technology / Building Society, MIT Press, 1992, p. 208. 
46 See Sarah Spiekermann and Franck Pallas, “Technology paternalism – wider implications of 
ubiquitous computing”, Poiesis Prax, 4, 2006, 6-18. 
47 http://www.research.ibm.com/autonomic/manifesto/ 
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A fundamental challenge raised by the new cooperation between humans 
and objects will thus be for the law to deal with this new form of “distributed 
agency”. Indeed a truly revolutionary feature of AmI is that they are systems 
where the individual sentient human being loses the exclusivity of “agency” he 
has traditionally enjoyed, at least from the point-of-view of law. Sociologists, 
such as Bruno Latour48, Michel Callon49 have acknowledged nonhuman agency in 
actor-network theory. Media artists have understood their poetic potential - that is, 
the potential they offer to imagine and create radically different spaces – and, 
relying on new information, communication and networking technologies, have 
begun indeed to “create” new spaces, new experimental experiences.50 But from 
the legal point of view, the spread of agency is resented as a true disruption. One 
reason for this is that the presumption that only sentient human beings exhibit 
‘agency’ is fundamental to the law’s capacity to assign individual responsibility 
and liability.  
This raises fundamental and very basic questions with regard to the 
functioning of law in a world of AmI: how shall legal responsibility be allocated 
for the potential harms and violations of rights when intentionality is ‘spread’ and 
not exclusively locatable in individual psychism? How to assign responsibilities 
in computer-controlled environments where it becomes impossible to locate and 
isolate the cause of potential damages resulting from combined agencies 
originating from computer hardware and software, networks, and human 
beings?51 How can meaning be ascribed to the ‘informed consent’ provided by 
                                                 
48 Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford 
University Press, 2005. 
49 Michel Callon, “Les réseaux sociaux à l’aune de la théorie de l’acteur-réseau”, Sociologies 
Pratiques, n.13, pp. 37-43, 2006.  
50 See Sha Xin Wei, “Poetics of performative space”, AI & Society, 21(4), June 2007. See also the 
Planetary Collegium / Montreal 2007 Summit, “Reviewing the Future: Vision, Innovation, 
emergence”, 19-22 April 2007 (abstracts viewable at http://summit.planetary-
collegium.net/abstracts.html ). Another example is Alternet Fabric, a private company composed 
of Architects, telecommunication and computer scientists and artists engaged in common 
architectural, esthetic and technologic projects (http://www.fabric.ch). 
51 See Hilty  et  al.  The Precautionary  Principle  in the Information Society – Effects of Pervasive 
Computing on  Health and Environment, Swiss Center for Technology  Assessment  (TA-SWISS), 
Bern (TA46e/2005) and  Scientific  technology  options  assessment  at  the  European  Parliament 
(STOA 124 EN). http://www.ta-swill.ch/www-
remain/reports_archive/publications/2005/050311_STOA125_PvC_72dpi_e.pdf 
p. 17 : « As a rule, it is not possible to isolate the cause of damage due to the combined effects of 
several components from computer hardware, programmes and data in networks, as no one can 
cope with the complexity of such distributed systems, neither mathematically nor legally. As 
society’s dependence on systems of this kind will grow with Pervasive Computing, a net increase 
in the damage derived from unmastered technical complexity has to be expected. As a 
consequence, a growing part of day-to-day life will, virtually, be removed from liability under the 
causation principle. » 
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individuals to the electronic treatment of personal data when individual 
preferences are from the outset framed by the norms of the ‘infosphere’? We will 
come back to those questions later on. For now, simply, acknowledge that  the 
‘performative’ power of AmI over individual desires, choices, preferences and 
behaviours, and the distribution of agency in AmI set unprecedented challenges 
for the law.  
An important challenge for the law in advanced AmI environments, but 
also in more modest visions encompassed in early projects developing pieces of 
technologies that might later be implemented in AmI systems, will be to deal with 
the increasing dissociation between the concept of ‘users’ and that of ‘agency’. 
Empowerment of ‘users’ through the mechanisms described in fair information 
principles formalized in the European data protection framework may only 
partially resolve the issue, as will be further explained in the next section. 
Advanced information and communication technologies are partially outpacing 
current legal protections of personal data and privacy in several ways, of which 
the confrontation of the technological visions embedded in the AmI systems with 
the fundamental principles of data protection and privacy provide many examples. 
To these challenges, the law does not necessarily have pre-determined, definitive 
and secure responses. Guarantees of fundamental rights and liberties in a world of 
ambient intelligence will not be found nor constructed by the law alone: it is now 
commonsense that the law alone, however well thought through and drafted, is ill 
equipped to provide exhaustive and sufficient responses to the normative and 
regulatory challenges of the advanced information society.  
In assessing the aspects, scope and value of privacy and data protection 
that are pertinent in the context of AmI (Section II), we will need to take those 
transversal concerns into account, as well as to acknowledge that privacy and data 
protection will have to rely on much more than law for their protection. A new 
regulatory metabolism, including law, technology and social deliberation will 
need to be activated. 
 
I.3 – A lesson from the transversal challenges? Towards a democracy-
sensitive technological design. 
 
The legal challenges of AmI visions are further complicated by the ubiquitous and 
“pleiotropic” characters of the emerging technologies, that is, respectively, their 
potentiality to be embedded in any object of our environment (cf. RFID tags) or 
even in the human body itself, and their capacity to develop in a multitude of 
unpredictable applications. That AmI-related technologies may be developed into 
a wide variety of unpredictable scenarios makes prospective legal inquiry intricate 
and renders it very difficult for the law to usefully regulate these developments a 
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priori.52 It is reasonable to assume that the law may have to evolve to 
accommodate the new challenges raised by AmI, but although the path followed 
by legal change is usually evolutionist (following a method of anchoring and 
adaptation), the unprecedented character of some of the issues awaiting regulation 
in a world of ubiquitous computing and ambient intelligence might well render 
former anchors irrelevant.  
Besides those methodological difficulties, the uncertainty and variety of 
potential applications (scenarios) has implications for more than one branch of 
law. Let us take, for instance, intellectual property law: a very practical problem  
soon to be confronted in this regard relates to the adaptation of intellectual 
property policies to individual innovations that are at the same time finalized 
inventions, and components embedded into other technological products or daily 
use objects. Allocation of patents on, say, RFIDs, allows private constructive pre-
emption of the new AmI space. The impact of IPRs as incentives or disincentives 
to innovate must be assessed anticipating the wide variety of undefined, 
unpredictable scenarios involving convergent technologies and the development 
of an “internet of objects”. Patents in this context are not merely about rewarding 
technological innovation and, thereby, producing positive incentives for the 
development of useful technological solutions to technical problems. For 
example, a patent over a basic technological element that may be involved in 
complex ambient intelligent networks grants power to the patent holder to orient 
the very construction of the “AmI ecosystem” (the vision of AmI implies that the 
human-digital interface indeed appear “natural”), a power that is not merely 
technological, but also highly political by nature: it is essentially a power over the 
political economy of information environments.  
From the transversal issues described above and from the new 
complexities facing legal regulation of unpredictable technological developments, 
it is undeniable that policy and technology have become increasingly 
interdependent.53 Legal principles, to be efficient, may need to be “embedded” in 
the technology itself (the development, encouraged by the European Commission, 
                                                 
52 See also Kevin D. Werbach, "Sensors and Sensibilities", Cardozo Law Review, 2007, 28(5): 
2321-2372, arguing that the fact that sensors will be embedded in the most trivial objects used in 
daily life will make it difficult for the law to regulate AmI technology itself: it would make it 
difficult or either impossible or enormously costly to either ban them altogether, restrict their use 
in specific circumstances, restrict specific uses of those devices, or even try to shape how the 
technology operates, as the devices in which it is embedded may be general-purposes devices. 
53 James X. Dempsey and Ira Rubinstein, “Lawyers and Technologists. Joined at Hips?”, IEEE 
Security and Privacy, May/June 2006, pp. 15-19. See also Paul M. Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s 
Code for internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices”, 
Wisconsin Law Review, 2000, p.787: “a central fashion in which regulation takes place in 
cyberspace is through “code”, that is, through technological configurations and system design 
choices.”  
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of privacy-enhancing technologies (PET’s), attests of the new distribution of 
regulating power between law and technology), with the implication that lawyers 
and engineers must engage in dialogue,54 and also that democratic debates should 
take place regarding what this will change. To illustrate, what was 'merely' legally 
prohibited may become technically impossible. What are the consequences are of 
making it technically impossible to contest a legal prohibition in court by making 
that prohibition technically impossible to breach in the first place ?  
The development of value-sensitive design in pervasive and context-aware 
information and communication systems requires “design guidelines that are both 
specific enough to provide meaningful direction and sufficiently flexible to be 
used across systems and deployment conditions”.55 As the current research and 
development projects in information and communication technology are the 
precursors of a technological revolution expected to crucially affect human 
experience and performance in both trivial and important behaviours and 
interactions constitutive of our economic, politic, cultural, social and intimate 
daily life, these design guidelines should moreover be democracy-sensitive, in the 
sense that they should themselves result from democratic deliberation, and 
increase democratic participation and inclusion. “Inventors” of AmI technologies 
cannot be characterized simply as problem-solvers ; the technology they develop 
is not simply aimed at solving problems that simply exist “out there”. They are 
also, “constructing” bundles of solutions who construct problems suited to their 
                                                 
54 See Lawrence Lessig, “The Architecture of Privacy”, Vanderbilt Entertainment Law and 
Practice, 1, 1999, and Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, 2000 where Lessig, 
advocating mixed property-based and technological solutions to the issue of privacy on the 
Internet,  suggests to structure privacy rules along a two-tier mechanism involving, on the one 
hand, acknowledgement that each individual has property interest in her own information and, on 
the other hand, the use of software transmission protocols to empower the individual with the 
possibility to control her access to the web-sites according to her privacy preferences and the 
extent to which each site’s practices meet meets those preferences. For a critique of Lessig’s 
approach, see Paul M. Schwartz, “Beyond Lessig’s Code for internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices”, Wisconsin Law Review, 2000, 743-788. Besides 
the argument that most users will probably never master and/or use the software transmission 
protocols (such as P3P), Schwartz criticizes Lessig’s idea that privacy protects a right of 
individual control, and rather suggests that privacy is a constitutive value that safeguards 
participation and association in a free society. Schwartz identifies the normative function of 
privacy as inhering in its relation to participatory democracy and individual self-determination. 
While he recognizes that a privacy market may play a role in helping information privacy fulfill its 
constitutive role, Schwartz considers that shortcomings and structural difficulties in that market 
make it improbable that those market failures can be spontaneously solved by the market itself. 
His recommendation is thus to rely on fair information practices, that he conceptualizes as a 
mixture of property and liability rules, with mandatory and default elements.  
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unique skills and ideas”; they  “invent both artifacts and frames of meanings”56 
and should therefore acknowledge the fundamentally political nature of their 
work. 
 
SECTION II – RELEVANCE, APPLICABILITY AND ADEQUACY OF THE EUROPEAN 
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO THE UNPRECEDENTED 
CHALLENGES IN AMI. 
 
Our orientation in thinking about privacy and data protection in a context of 
ambient intelligence is to consider the scope, meaning and value of those rights in 
a contextualized and pragmatic manner rather than in a purely positivist way. Law 
is ‘not a tangible object of the real world’, but a ‘concept or process’.57 That one 
needs to be able to identify what it is, in each context, that privacy and data 
protection protect in order to balance privacy and data protection principles 
against competing principles and legitimate interests, may appear a truism, but a 
truism that most positivist legal scholarship appears to forget, failing to assess, 
behind positive laws, the extra-legal values promoted. An important task in 
assessing the relevance, applicability and adequacy of the European privacy and 
data protection legal frameworks is to distinguish, as separate issues, the scope 
(aspects of privacy), the values (or normative grounds) of privacy, and the 
instruments of privacy and data protection. The abundant literature on privacy 
rarely makes those distinctions explicit, and, as a result, sometimes obscures 
rather than clarifies what indeed is meant by the legal concept of “privacy” in the 
advanced information society.58 
It is only through consideration of the nature of the threats that the new 
information and communication technologies raise for a free and democratic 
society that one may identify the type of privacy protections needed in the current 
                                                 
56 W. Bernard Carlson, “Artifacts and Frames of Meaning: Thomas A. Edison, His Managers, and 
the Cultural Construction of Motion Pictures”, in. Wiebe E. Bijker, J. Law, eds., Shaping 
Technology/Building Society. Studies in Sociotechnical Change, pp. 175-176.  
57 L. Friedman, Law and Society. An Introduction, Prentice Hall, 1977, p. 3. 
58 Serge Gutwirth and Paul De Hert, usefully make those distinctions. One agrees with their 
suggestion that privacy is a tool that shield individuals against others’ interferences, and regret, 
with them, that, as far as data protection is concerned, transparency seems to have replaced 
legitimacy as the core value of data protection. (Serge Gutwirth, Paul De Hert, “Privacy, data 
protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and transparency of power”, in Erik 
Claes, Anthony Duff and Serge Gutwirth, Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2006.) That 
indeed the ‘legitimacy’ imperative of data processing is not sufficiently assessed by Courts may in 
part be explained by the pression that the ‘absolute logics’ of security and efficiency impose on 
any proportionality test that one might wish to implement in assessing the legitimacy of data 
processing.    
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configuration of our society and for the future.59 The legal concept of privacy we 
need in a world of ambient intelligence will not necessarily be the same concept 
as the one we needed in a pre-information society. In the pre-information society, 
local social norms (like norms of decency regulating what people were allowed to 
disclose or not in public), strong physical and temporal boundaries (like walls and 
the limitation of human memory), a framing of issues of security and efficiency 
different from the one experiences nowadays (with security and efficiency largely 
imposed as absolute logics trumping other considerations), and the fact that 
personal information was not yet considered, as it is today, as a basic resource of 
informational capitalism60 (no “market” for personal information existed), privacy 
laws protecting only intimate matters and sensitive information were arguably 
playing their role satisfactorily in view of maintaining the free and democratic 
characteristics of society.  
As Lisa Austin argues, however,  
“because technology creates privacy issues that fall outside the bounds of our traditional 
analysis – known and even accepted surveillance, collection of non-intimate information, 
collection of information in public – we do need to sharpen and deepen our understanding 
of traditional concerns regarding privacy in order to respond to these new situations.” 61 
Sharpening and deepening our understanding of traditional concerns 
regarding privacy and data protection is what is attempted in the following pages.   
 
II.1 - The right to privacy 
 
II.1.1. The scope of privacy. 
 
AmI technologies have the potential to increase the ‘visibility’ of the wide range 
of daily experiences that compose the fabric of everyday life and that, for a 
significant part, we never even had to think of as ‘private’ or ‘anonymous’,62 as 
                                                 
59 Article 1 of the “Data protection directive” (95/46/EC) explicitly frame data protection in the 
larger context of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms: “In accordance with this 
Directive, Member States shall protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”  
60 Perri6 (1998) Private Life and Public Policy in The future of Privacy: Public Trust in the Use of 
Private Information v. 2, Lasky, K and Fletcher, A (eds), Demos Medical Publishing: “what is 
distinctive about informational capitalism is that personal information has become the basic fuel 
on which modern business and government run and (…) the systematic accumulation, 
warehousing, processing, analysis, targeting, matching, manipulation and use of personal 
information is producing new forms of government and business (…).” 
61 Lisa Austin, “Privacy and the Question of Technology”, Law and Philosohpy, 22, 2003, p. 164.  
62 Anonymity has been described famously by Alan F. Westin as a form of privacy “that occurs 
when the individual is in public places or performing public acts but still seeks, and finds, freedom 
from identification and surveillance” (Privacy and Freedom, Athenaeum, 1967.) Anonymity is 
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there were no reasons to fear being ‘watched’, recorded and interpreted by others, 
either because the technical capabilities to do so were lacking, or because we 
thought those experiences were so trivial and meaningless that nobody would ever 
pay attention to them. 
A useful question to ask is: what aspects of our life are protected when we 
‘have’ privacy? Spatial, informational, emotional, relational, communicational 
privacy are various ‘aspects’ of privacy with which AmI technologies may 
interfere.  
Communicational privacy is explicitly acknowledged in Article 8 of the 
European Court of Human Rights and in Article 7 of the European Charter of 
Human Rights, and suggests the enjoyment of a certain level of intimacy when 
one communicates with others, even in the public space, as well as a guarantee of 
some confidentiality of the content of our communications with others. 
We can moreover feel ‘privacy’ when we have our ‘spatial’ territory, such 
as our home, protected from unconsented intrusions by others. Protection of the 
home is indeed explicitly acknowledged in Article 8 of the European Court of 
Human Rights and in Article 7 of the European Charter of Human Rights. 
Ubiquitous and pervasive computing easily crosses walls, and has the potential to 
interfere with our spatial privacy. 
We also share the notion that our own body should be protected from 
intrusive gazes. The reason why we wear clothes is not exclusively the need to 
protect ourselves from the cold or from the sun. There is something more: 
physical privacy (in the American Constitution, protection against unwarranted 
searches and seizures protects, to a certain extent, the physical privacy of the 
citizens).  In this regard, protection of the legitimate interests of individuals may 
require reconsidering the “boundaries” of the subject. The European Group on 
Ethics of Science and Technologies suggested, in its 2005 report on ethical 
aspects of ITC implants in the human body, a broader conception of the individual 
endowed with the right to claim the total respect of a body, which is at the same 
time physical and virtual.  The idea has been suggested, for a few years already, 
(and especially in feminist and post-structuralist scholarship), that the person, the 
subject deserving legal protection, is irreducible to the spatially situated and 
physically circumscribed subject.63 Disembodied informational samples gathered 
                                                                                                                                     
certainly something most people expect to have even in public places, although, as it will be 
argued, because expectations of privacy and anonymity are indeed inversely proportional to the 
intensity of surveillance, those expectations are probably prone to decrease in the coming years, if 
the ‘security state’ further develops. 
63See Haraway, D J (1997) Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millenium. 
FemaleMan\_Meets\_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience, Routledge, p.  247) : ‘Most 
fundamentally,(…) the human genome projects produce entities of a different ontological kind 
than flesh-and-blood organisms (…) or any other sort of “normal” organic being (...) the human 
genome projects produce ontologically specific things called databases as objects of knowledge 
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in databanks, in that view, constitute ‘informational identities’64 parallel to – but 
interacting with - the physically embedded identities, and independent from the 
personal biographies through which individuals construct and maintain their self-
perception. How ‘physical privacy’ interacts with the potential legitimate interests 
that a person has in the protection of his or her ‘digital’ or ‘virtual’ identity would 
be an interesting field of research. 
Informational privacy is a notion that appears quite obvious to most 
people, although they are not necessarily conscious that images, sounds, 
movements ‘emanating’ from their body are indeed at stake when they think of 
informational privacy. The usual way to protect informational privacy is by 
empowering the subject with (legal and/or technical) means to control the 
collection and use of personal information. 
Privacy may also be conceived as protecting one’s “thoughts, emotions, 
and sensations”65 and thereby one’s "right to inviolate personality”. The tracking 
and analysis of facial expressions in order to derive information about 
“users”’emotions obviously interferes with the enjoyment of emotional privacy. 
As has already been mentioned, the European Court of Human Rights 
acknowledged that the right to privacy is not something that must necessarily be 
lived in isolation: the right to enter in relationships with others, or the right to 
relational privacy, is part of the right to privacy. This is not surprising if indeed 
one understands the right to privacy as the right to construct one’s personality free 
from unreasonable constraints. Relations with others are essential to the 
construction of an individual’s personality. Respect for relational privacy may 
require others to abstain from interfering with the personal relationships. 
That legitimate interests of privacy may be acknowledged in those, and 
many other, diverse dimensions of human existence does not necessarily imply 
that those interests always trump competing interests of others (the government, 
enterprises, other individual). It is the law’s business to balance these legitimate 
interests of the subject against the competing interests of others to interfere with 
his ‘privacy’. Several methods exist to this end. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has repeatedly conditioned her 
acknowledgement of the existence of a right of privacy in specific area of human 
life to the existence of ‘reasonable expectations of privacy’ in those areas. The 
major weakness of such a method is that the generalization of surveillance 
                                                                                                                                     
and practice. The human to be represented, then, has a particular kind of totality, or species being, 
as well as a specific kind of individuality. At whatever level of individuality or collectivity, from a 
single gene region extracted from one sample through the whole species genome, this human is 
itself an informational structure.’  
64 See Katja Franko Aas, “The body does not lie’ : Identity, risk and trust in technoculture”, 
Crime, Media, Culture, 2006, 2(2):143-158. 
65 Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy”, Harv. L. Rev. 1890, p. 193. 
25
Rouvroy: Privacy and Ambient Intelligence
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
 
 
devices, especially in the public space, decreases the public’s expectations of 
privacy anyway. It is not useless to recall that although ‘expectations of privacy’ 
do not play such an important role for the definition of the right to privacy in 
Europe, the decrease of expectations of privacy will necessarily negatively impact 
the probability that people will indeed claim respect of their right to privacy in 
those new areas where they are ‘observed’, as well as reduce the likelihood that 
people will refuse their consent to being ‘observed’. Preserving awareness about 
issues of privacy may be both of paramount importance and enormously 
challenging the more we progress in the surveillance society. A theory of privacy 
relying on ‘expectations of privacy’ cannot more be justified by saying that what 
privacy is about is the right individuals have not to be ‘surprised’ by surveillance 
devices they ignored to be there. Even where people know they are observed, and 
thus have no expectation of privacy because they have been informed that 
surveillance devices are in use, surveillance, even overt, and not hidden, may 
cause people harms that they would probably describe as invasion of their 
privacy. The most unsophisticated example of this would be an instance where 
video cameras have been placed in public toilets. More subtle instances would be, 
for example, instances where employees would know they are being monitored by 
their employer and their productivity evaluated in real time. Although they do not 
have expectations of privacy in that case, they still have lost something that 
resembles very much ‘their privacy’. 
Another method, more usual in Europe, for balancing competing interests 
and establishing whether or not, in each situation, there is a right to privacy or not, 
and whether or not legitimate and sufficiently compelling reasons exist for 
allowing interferences with that right, is normative inquiry.  
 
II.1.2. The normative grounds of the right to privacy. 
 
The normative grounds of privacy are logically contingent on the type or aspect of 
privacy that is being considered. For the purpose of this paper, although we 
acknowledge that other aspects of privacy are obviously involved in the scenarios 
potentially ensuing from AmI systems, we will restrict our inquiry to 
informational privacy. 
II.1.2.1. Powerful political, economic and cultural forces militate against 
informational privacy. 
 
Some of the fundamental assumptions shaping both the technological and legal 
developments of the day are inextricably bound within the fabric of our current 
political economy. They form and are formed by the political, economic, and 
social context that commands the development of the information society.  
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The current support for, and massive investment in, the development and 
intensification of the information society (where the term ‘information’ refers 
essentially to ‘personal information’, as the new technological devices developed 
are essentially constructed as to channel personal information about individual 
citizens, patients, suspects, consumers from those individuals to public 
authorities, government officials, commercial enterprises, managers), is (in part) 
derived from, and in turn (in part) reinforces, two simultaneous evolutions: the 
advent of the security imperative on the one hand, and the individualization of 
risks in the neo-liberal societies on the other hand. 
 
a) The security imperative. 
 
A first evolution relates to the security imperative that has become an absolute 
logic, in both law enforcement and, to a lesser extend, socio-economic relations, 
trumping all other considerations and is therefore absolved, to a large extent, from 
proportionality tests. In this logic, the entirety of human behaviours and 
interactions are subjected to control and scrutiny. The logic of security, because it 
is absolute by nature, does not tolerate the competing claims of privacy. 66In the 
context of law enforcement, Rainer Nickel notes  
“the shift from enabling ‘freedom’ to upholding ‘security’ as the central description of 
the function of the nation-state. This shift has severe implications for the discourse on 
human or constitutional rights and their a priori status as a constraint on the popular 
sovereign: from infinite detention, through (bio) data collections on an unprecedented 
scale, to the use of torture,and from pre-emptive shootings of suspects and kidnapped or 
suspicious passenger planes to pre-emptive wars, the security paradigm seems to trump 
the traditional notion of inalienable individual rights and replace them with the rule that 
the end justifies the means.”67 
In that ‘security paradigm’, clams to have one’s privacy respected is less 
perceived as the exercise of a fundamental right than as a way for those who 
claim to have their privacy respected to try hiding a wrong. To a certain extent, 
the anti-privacy rhetoric used to sustain the “security paradigm” is the same as the 
anti-privacy rhetoric used by law and economics scholars such as Posner and 
Epstein, seeing personal privacy not as a final value, but merely as an instrument 
                                                 
66 See Institute for Prospective Technological Studies – Joint Research centre, Security and 
Privacy for the Citizen in the Post-September 11 Digital Age. A prospective overview. Report to 
the European Parliament Committee on Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs 
(LIBE), July 2003, IPTS Technical Reports Series, EUR 20823 EN, 97. See also Hardt, M. et 
Negri, A., (2004) Multitude. Guerre et démocratie à l’âge de l’empire. La Découverte, pp. 240-
246. 
67 Rainer Nickel, “Private and Public Autonomy Revisited: Jürgen Habermas’ Concept of Co-
Originality in Times of Globalisation and the Militant Security State”, EUI Working Paper, Law 
No. 2006/27. 
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used by dishonest people to deceive others,68 under the assumption that honest 
people do not have reasons to value their privacy.  
In the socio-economic context, the most radical law and economics 
theories, prolonging utilitarian theories, ground their arguments against any form 
of regulation restricting access to personal information by market agents, on the 
idea that protecting an individual right to privacy, and allowing individuals to ‘lie’ 
in the socio-economic exchanges, undermines the common good, understood as 
the aggregate welfare in society. « People should not - on economic grounds, in 
any event - have a right to conceal material facts about themselves », Posner 
argues.69 Allowing people to conceal personal information relating to things such 
as ‘arrest records, health, credit-worthiness, marital status, sexual proclivities’ 
would likely result in people concealing discreditable facts about themselves with 
the aim of selling their services or involvement at an improperly high price.70 
Those who  
« profess high standards of behaviour in order to induce others to engage in social or 
business dealings with them from which they derive an advantage but at the same time 
they conceal some of the facts that these acquaintances would find useful in forming an 
accurate picture of their character.”71 
In its ‘law and economics’ version, the value of privacy is thus essentially 
anti-social, instrumental, whereas personal information is a form of ‘input into the 
production of income or some other broad measure of utility or welfare’. Privacy, 
those authors argue, should be protected only when it increases wealth and social 
utility but should be assigned away from individuals when it does not, and 
especially as it allows anti-social behaviours. The method developed by Richard 
                                                 
68 See Richard Epstein, « How Much Privacy Do We Really Want? », Hoover Digest, n.2, 2002 
and Ruth Gavison, « Privacy and the Limits of Law » in Ferdinand D. Schoeman (ed.), 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Antology, Cambridge University Press, 1984.  
69 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12: 399. 
70 Richard A. Posner, ‘The Right of Privacy’, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12: 393-422; Richard A. 
Posner, « An Economic theory of Privacy » in Ferdinand D. Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Antology, Cambridge University Press, 1984. Privacy allows 
individuals to manipulate access to personal information and therefore the world around them, 
thereby increasing transaction costs between bargaining parties and creating harmful information 
asymmetries. Individuals, in that view, are essentially bad persons, whose main aims in life are 
oriented by their desire to gain unwarranted advantages over others rather than to cooperate with 
others. For a critique of Posner's views on privacy see Baker, C E ‘Posner's Privacy Mystery and 
the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law’, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12(3): 475-496. 
71 As stated by Ferdinand Schoeman, there are numerous grounds for puzzling over the 
significance and value of privacy. ‘The right to privacy is seen as creating the context in which 
both deceit and hypocrisy may flourish: It provides the cover under which most human 
wrongdoing takes place, and then it protects the guilty from taking responsibility for their 
transgressions once committed’. (Ferdinand D. Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An Antology, Cambridge University Press, 1984.) 
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Posner for deciding about this assignment of informational privacy consists of a 
twofold test. The first test consists of an inquiry into whether (1) the personal 
information is ‘a by-product of socially productive activity’, and (2) ‘its 
compelled disclosure would impair the incentives to engage in that activity’. 
Posner's conclusion is that while corporate data and other trade secrets should 
generally be protected (meaning – under US law - that the employee generally 
loses control over intellectual property they create at work?72), most facts about 
people should not. Indeed, he writes: “Secrecy is an important method of 
appropriating social benefits to the entrepreneur who creates them while in private 
life it is more likely to conceal discreditable facts.”73 
The theory may undoubtedly well increase the power asymmetry between, 
for example, workers and employers, but it is a common criticism addressed 
against utilitarianism that it disregards the widely shared taste for fairness.74 
Richard Epstein, defining his own view in these cases as remaining that of 
an unrepentant libertarian, viewing employees as having no legitimate interest in 
the protection of their personal information against the employer, argues that 
personal information is, after all, nothing more than a commodity that should be 
allocated according to market rules:  
“The employer can ask any question of the prospective employee that she wants. The 
applicant may refuse to answer. In the end, the two can decide whether the information is 
more valuable when kept private or when shared. In many cases, the personal life of an 
employee will be regarded as information to which the employer has no right. If so, it 
will not be because of some high principle, but because of the joint recognition that the 
information is worth less to the employer than its concealment is worth for the employee. 
Let the employee receive comprehensive benefits from the employer, such as health care, 
and the calculus may well shift radically: now it does matter whether the employee 
drinks, smokes, or exercises on a regular basis. If that information is relevant to an 
insurer in setting risk, then it is relevant to the employer who has to foot the bill for the 
long-term health plan.”75 
In Richard Epstein’ view, and in the view of those taking inspiration from 
him,76 privacy of personal information in the workplace should no longer be 
                                                 
72 On that question, see Catherine Fisk, « Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the 
Ownership of Human Capital », Connecticut Law Review, 2002, 34 : 765-782. 
73 Richard A. Posner, “The Right of Privacy”, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12: 393-422 
74 See W. Farnsworth, “The Taste for Fairness”, Columbia Law Review, 2002, 102: 1998-2010. 
75 Richard Epstein, “Deconstructing Privacy and Putting it Back together Again”, Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 2000, 17(2): 22. 
76See for example Tom Miller, Director of health Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Testimony on 
Genetic privacy, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution on genetic privacy, 
September 12, 2002.: ‘Rather than rely on greater regulation of information flows simply because 
they are labelled genetic, we should restore and renew our commitment to competitive markets, 
private property rights, and private contracts.’  
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granted any protection. The presupposition made is that the employer is entitled to 
know anything about the employee in which it has an interest. No need to say here 
that such a presupposition, granting employers prima facie entitlements to any 
private information about their employees, is contradicted by social conventions 
and certain normative values placing much of the personal life of employees, 
including facts that may indeed impact on job performance, such as the kind of 
lifestyle employees have after work hours and during the week-ends, beyond the 
legitimate concern of employers. Economic relevance of private information does 
not suspend the normative value of privacy.77 
According to ‘hard law and economics’ supporters, however, the 
transaction costs arising from uncertainties about the genetic status of persons, 
and information asymmetries existing between the contracting parties, decrease 
the efficiency of the marketplace, and is thus incompatible with the common 
good. Some would even suggest that those who create or refuse to abolish a 
removable uncertainty should be held responsible for the transaction costs 
associated with the lack of transparency, and should accordingly be charged for 
those increased costs.78 Those who want privacy for themselves, refusing thereby 
to be submitted to the transparency imperative of the market, should thus pay the 
cost of privacy. In order to be competitive, however, any market trader should 
take privacy seriously. Respect for consumers’ preferences for privacy might 
become a commercial argument: provision of privacy, on a competitive market, 
should be beneficial to those agents who provide it when other agents don't (at 
least if one considers that consumers would usually prefer to be protected in their 
privacy). 
 
b) The individualization of risks. 
 
Besides this ‘security imperative’ at play in both the field of law enforcement and 
socio-economic relations, there are the institutional shifts accompanying 
neoliberalism and the ensuing social need to ground identification of individuals 
and predictions of their risks and behaviours on private information, such as 
health, lifestyle, consumption habits, etc. The compulsive interest for private 
information, in a perspective that locates the main source of risks in personal 
characteristics and behaviours, indeed reflects the move western societies are 
                                                                                                                                     
(http://www.house.gov/judiciary/miller091202.htm#_edn11>)  
77 Restrictions of the type of information insurers or employer scan ask about prospective policy-
holders and job applicants are based on that consideration, and may sometimes be viewed as 
indirect ways to implement redistributive policy. In the same sense, legal interference with 
contractual freedom may be a legitimate instrument of redistributive policies. See A.T. Kronman, 
“Paternalism and the Law of Contracts”, Yale Law Journal, 1983,  92: 770. 
78What the law and economics movement teaches us, at least, is that the protection of privacy on 
the marketplace raises a cost that should be paid by someone.  
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currently experiencing from the model of the universal insurance society, or 
welfare state, to the actuarial post-Keynesian society. In the actuarial post-
Keynesian society, the two significant attributes are the decrease of individual 
privacy and the rise of discourses of personal responsibility and personal 
accountability for bad luck.  
A first assumption is that personal information about individuals is the 
most precious input for the planning and management of governmental and 
business activities, as it is believed that private information necessarily allows 
accurate predictions of risks and behaviours and a significant reduction of the 
costs associated with uncertainty.79 As a matter of fact, despite the explicit 
acknowledgement of human rights as “constitutional instruments of the European 
public order”,80 and the reaffirmation, by Article 6 (ex Article F) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is 
part of the grounds of the European Union81, privacy interests are increasingly 
trumped by the needs of governments and businesses to use a wide range of 
personal information about individuals in order to increase security and to 
minimise transaction costs and other inefficiencies born by informational 
asymmetries.  
As selectivity replaces universality as a principle for the distribution of 
welfare benefits, discourses of personal empowerment, activation and 
responsibility induce individuals to assume personal responsibility for most 
adverse circumstances resulting from ‘brute bad luck’, for which they would have 
expected some compensation from the community in a traditional welfare-state. 
In this way, the concept of ‘risk’ becomes a privileged disciplinary tool of post-
Keynesian governance: it functions as a ‘technology of the self’, urging 
individuals to get the most information they can about their personal risk status, to 
act ‘rationally and responsively’ after having been so informed, and to take the 
responsibility to minimize their risks. 82 
Whereas the insurance society typical of the welfare state shifted the focus 
from the subjective notion of behaviour and individual responsibility to the 
objective notion of risk as probabilities, and replaced moral assessment of 
                                                 
79 Julie E. Cohen, « Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Je rey Rosen », 
Georgetown Law Journal, 2001, 89 : 2029-2045. 
80 Loizidou v. Turquie (preliminary exceptions) ECHR (1995), series A vol. 310, 27 § 75. 
81 Even before the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
Court of Justice of the European Community protected fundamental rights in its jurisdiction as 
they are part of the unwritten general principles of community law. See Dean Spielmann, 
“Jurisprudence des jurisdictions de Strasbourg et de Luxembourg dans le domaine des droits de 
l’homme: conflits, incohérences et complémentarités”, in. Philip Alston (ed.), L’Union 
Européenne et des Droits de l’Homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001. 
82 In this regard see developments in A. Rouvroy, Human Genes and Neoliberal Governance: A 
Foucauldian Critique, Routledge-Cavendish (GlassHouse books), 2008. 
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individual behaviours by amoral statistics, in the rising post-Keynesian society, 
the notion of risk loses its moral neutrality and, paradoxically, its statistical 
validity, when ‘the acceptance of solidarity is accompanied by a demand for 
control over personal behaviour.’83 The current support for ‘active social policy’ 
epitomizes this ‘moralizing’ tendency, as it explicitly ‘stresses the importance of 
shifting the focus of social programmes from insuring individuals against a few, 
well-defined contingencies towards investing in their capabilities and making use 
of them to the best of their potential at every stage of the life course.’84 
Governance through the concept of risk dissuades individuals from making claims 
on collective public or private pools and rather focuses on what they might 
change in their lifestyle, diet, professional activity and leisure so as to minimise 
their risks. Governing through risks absolves economic, social and political 
institutions from their responsibility in engendering diseases and disabilities, but 
requires pervasive systems of surveillance to be implemented. 
Why do we fear (public and private) surveillance? In Transparent Society: 
Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?, David 
Brin85 argues that the generalization of observation and surveillance, instead of 
constituting a threat for our fundamental rights and freedoms, may bring even 
greater freedom, total transparency of every-one to every-one being the only way 
to guarantee liberty provided that the power of observation and surveillance be 
shared by us all rather than only by the police, the wealthiest or the most 
powerful. Thought-provoking as he may be, Brin nevertheless pointed to a 
fundamental reason why surveillance as it is now developing in public and private 
spaces is frightening: information about others provides, to the person who 
controls that information, much power over those others. Privacy, in this view, is 
thus not so much about protecting a subjective sense of intimacy or of decency as 
it is about preventing situations where those who know things about others that 
not everybody knows be allowed, due to their privileged position in the 
information economy, to take advantage of the power this situation provides them 
to constrain others. I will return to that later. Either increased privacy or total 
transparency can guarantee against that threat, as total transparency of everyone to 
everyone would suppress the differential op power assigned by access to 
restricted knowledge. Gillom provided a very useful analysis of the effects of 
surveillance. According to him, the effects of surveillance include:“degradation, 
the loss of control, the implied suspicion, the feelings of  being just a number, the 
anxiety over errors or subterfuges being caught, the fear of malevolence or 
                                                 
83 Pierre Rosanvallon,  La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l'État providence, Seuil, 1995. 
84 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005) Extending Opportunities: 
How Active Social Policy Can Benefit Us All, OECD. 
85 In Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between Privacy and Freedom?, 
Perseus Books Group (1999).  
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incompetence on the part of surveillance practitioners, the fear of breaking rules 
or departing from norms that are unknown, and, especially, the need or desire to 
break the rules.”86 
The fact that the information society takes the orientation of a surveillance 
society is not a spontaneous phenomenon, nor the unpredictable result of 
scientific progress, but epitomizes the phenomenon of co-production between 
technology and society, notably popularized by Sheila Jasanoff.87 Acknowledging 
that science, business, and politics are not separated spheres of human activity, 
but are rather interacting indistinctively in our collective ‘social metabolism’, 
increases the necessity that the material, cultural, social and political conditions of 
the democratic process be present from the beginning in the design of techno-
scientific development. 
 
II.1.2.2. Reassessing the normative grounds for privacy. 
 
Strong privacy-adverse reasoning in contemporary society makes the need to 
ground privacy on strong normative grounds more crucial than ever. I would like 
to reassess those grounds on the basis of what I have already suggested about the 
intimate link between privacy and individual and political autonomy. In such a 
view, privacy appears as a precondition to the meaningful exercise of most other 
fundamental individual attributes and capabilities, such as human dignity and 
individual autonomy, and as a social structural instrument aimed at fostering 
social justice, democracy and the other values which our Western democracies are 
supposed to praise so much. 
John Dewey argues that rights need not be justified as the immutable 
possession of the individual, but as instrumental in light of ‘the contribution they 
make to the welfare of the community’.88 Rather than merely a tool for the 
realisation of individual liberties (agent-relative values), privacy (thoroughly 
conceived to take into account the complex and heterogeneous meanings of 
private information) may be an essential structural tool, for the preservation of 
autonomous individuals empowered with the contestation (and reconstitution) 
abilities (typically agent-neutral values) needed in order to negotiate a new social 
contract on the threshold of an information era characterized by the possibility of 
                                                 
86 John Gilliom, Overseers the Poor, Chicago University Press, 2001, p. 125. 
87 Sheila Jasanoff, States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order, 
Routledge, 2004. 
88 John Dewey, « Liberalism and Civil Liberties » in John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953 : 
1938/Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Vol. 12, Boydston, J A (ed.), Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1991, p. 374. 
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refining, in an exponential manner, the classification of people in categories of 
risks, merits, abilities, etc.89 
As already suggested, privacy (as ‘insulation’) guarantees the possibility 
for the subject to think differently from the majority and to revise his first order 
preferences. Thus, privacy is a condition for the existence of ‘subjects’ capable of 
participating in a deliberative democracy. As a consequence, privacy also protects 
lawful, but unpopular, lifestyles against social pressures to conform to dominant 
social norms. Privacy as freedom from unreasonable constraints in the 
construction of one’s identity, serves to prevent or combat the “tyranny of the 
majority”. The right to privacy and the right not to be discriminated against have 
in common that they protect the opportunities, for individuals, to experiment a 
diversity of non-conventional ways of life.90 Privacy is itself a tool for preventing 
invidious discriminations and prejudices. 
Strahilevitz recently argued against this position that there is often an 
essential conflict between information privacy and antidiscrimination principles, 
as non-disclosure of pertinent information about a job applicant such as their 
criminal history induce employers to rely more heavily on distasteful statistical 
discrimination strategies: 
“In the information age, we should consider approaching the statistical discrimination 
problem (…) using the government to help provide decision makers with something that 
approximates complete information about each applicant, so that readily discernable facts 
like race or gender will not be overemphasized and more obscure but relevant facts, like 
past job performance and social capital, will loom larger.”91 
Yet, the argument is easily dismissed: nothing indeed guarantees that 
information about past diseases, records of past convictions, etc. are in any way 
relevant to assess the job applicant’s suitability for the job. As a consequence, it is 
                                                 
89 In the same sense, see Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, « Privacy Law, Data Protection and 
Law Enforcement. Opacity of the individual and Transparency of Power”, in. Eric Claes and Serge 
Gutwirth, eds., Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2006, pp.61-101. 
90 See particularly Charles Fried, “Privacy: a moral analysis.”, Yale Law Journal, 1968, 77:475-93, 
arguing that informational privacy rights serve to free us “to do or say things not forbidden by the 
restraints of morality, but which are nonetheless unpopular or unconventional.” In that sense, the 
right to privacy as guaranteed in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been 
interpreted as implying the right, for people belonging to the Tzigan community, to live in 
caravans, such way of life being constitutive of the Tzigan way of life, that has to be respected as 
part of their right to private and family life. See Coster v. United Kingdom (n°24876/94) and  
Chapman v. United Kingdom (n°27238/95) of January 18, 2001. The European Court on Human 
Rights has also acknowledged that failure to legally acknowledge the new sexual identity of a 
trans-sexual person constituted a violation of her right to privacy.  See I v. United Kingdom 
(requête n° 25680/94) of July 11, 2002. 
91 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “Privacy versus Antidiscrimination”, Chicago Law & Economics 
Working Paper, No. 349 (2D Series), July 2007. 
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most probable that more information would increase the reach of the employer’s 
prejudices much more than it would increase a job applicant’s opportunities. 
The rationale grounded on prevention of discrimination for constraints 
imposed on the free trade of personal information between concerned persons and 
their employers, insurers and other interested third parties is much challenged, 
however, especially in the United States. In neo-rule-utilitarian reasoning92, 
economic efficiency may be considered as the final value, the prevention of 
discrimination then being instrumental and contingent to realizing efficiency.93 
Those debates attest to a fundamental ambiguity inherent to human rights 
discourses, an ambivalence between two conceptions of individual liberty, the 
roots of which have been located in the Anglo-American and the European 
traditions respectively.  
Privacy may moreover be necessary to guarantee a certain level of 
distributive justice, by maintaining of a certain degree of information asymmetry. 
Information asymmetries may be necessary to prevent “rational” discrimination 
that would deprive some individuals from access to basic goods such as 
subsistence food, healthcare and insurance. The perspective of ‘dynamic pricing’ 
for essential goods is incompatible with common views about justice and fairness. 
This substantiates our claim that, contrary to the frequent assertion, the ‘opacity’ 
of individual subjects may be, as much or even, in some circumstances, more 
favourable to the common good.  
That leads us to the consideration that will introduce the next section: 
private information is power, and the normative ground of data protection is the 
balancing of power between data controllers and data subjects. 
 
II.2 -The right to data protection.  
 
II.2.1. Are potential application scenarios of AmI in the scope of application of 
the data protection directives? 
 
The questions one needs to reflect on regarding “personal data” include the 
following. Can we value “personal information” as we value ‘other’ commodities 
(as ‘law and economics’ scholars would have it)? Should “personal information” 
rather be analyzed in terms of the power it confers to those in control of it (as the 
European data protection directives suggest)? Is some “personal information” so 
closely related to the individual’s personality that some measures of inalienability 
should be enforced? Or are there other reasons, related to the public’s interest, 
that would require the implementation of strong legal restrictions on the 
                                                 
92 Rule utilitarianism requires not that individuals maximize welfare as they act, but rather that 
they conform their acts to rules that maximize welfare.  
93 Richard W. Wright,  “The Principles of Justice”, Notre Dame Law Review, 2000,  75: 1859. 
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possibility for information to cross the former social and physical borders that 
guaranteed the ‘impermeability’ of social microcosms? More importantly, for our 
immediate purpose, we should assess whether the European Data Protection 
directives are indeed applicable in a context of AmI.  
The Directive 95/46/EC only applies to processing of personal data, 
which it defines, as  
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an 
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by 
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.” 
The concept of personal data has recently been elucidated by the Article 
29 Working Party on the protection of personal data94, according to which the 
concept of personal data refers to: 
- “any information”, either objective (such as the substances in one’s 
blood) or subjective (such as opinions or assessments), either correct or incorrect, 
about individuals, regardless of their position or capacity (as consumer, patient, 
employee, etc.), and regardless of the format or medium on which that 
information is contained (numerical, graphical, photographical, acoustic); 
- that relates, even indirectly, to individuals (information on the 
functioning of a machine where human intervention is required and allowing to 
ascertain the productivity of the person working on that machine, or information 
about the length and pace of a queue, allowing to ascertain the productivity of an 
employee in an office or a shop),95 either because it contains information about a 
particular person, and/or because that information is processed for the purpose of 
evaluating, treating in a certain way or influencing the status or behaviour of an 
individual, and/or because the processing of that information is likely to have an 
impact on a certain person’s rights and interests (the mere fact that the individual 
could be treated differently from others as the result of the processing of the data 
counts as “impact” in this regard), taking into account all the circumstances 
surrounding the case. 
This broad understanding of the concept of personal data is not 
unanimously endorsed in all the countries of the European Community. For 
example, although the French law of August 2004 defines personal data as: “toute 
                                                 
94 Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
(WP29),    Opinion on the concept of personal data, WP 136 of 20th June 2007, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf  
95 The WP29 had previously noted, in the context of its discussion on the data protection issues 
raised by RFID tags, that “data relates to an individual if it refers to the identity, characteristics or 
behaviour of an individual or if such information is used to determine or influence the way in 
which that person is treated or evaluated.” (Working Party document No WP 105: "Working 
document on data protection issues related to RFID technology", adopted on 19.1.2005, p. 8.) 
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information relative à une personne physique qui peut être identifiée, directement 
ou indirectement, par reference à un numéro d’identitification, ou à un ou 
plusieurs elements qui lui sont propres”.96 However, in the UK, the concept of 
personal data has been interpreted more restrictively by the Court of Appeal’s 
2003 decision in Duran v. FSA (a case about disclosure of information in the 
financial service sector), restricting the meaning of “personal data” to information 
that is “biographical in a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of 
the putative data subject’s involvement in a matter or event that has no personal 
connotations”.97 How the interpretation by the Article 29 Working Party will 
impact of future interpretation of the applicability of the directive in a world of 
ambient intelligence remains to be seen. 
Another issue relates to the category of sensitive data. Although, by 
default, the European Data Protection framework organizes the “transparency” of 
personal information, designing rules for the processing of personal data, some 
types of personal data, that the directive qualifies as sensitive data,  are excluded 
from the framework and may never be processed. In principle, Article 8 of the 
Directive 95/46/EC makes it illegal to process personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and data concerning health or sex life.98 This raises particular 
                                                 
96 Article 2 al. 2 Law of 6 January 1978 modified in august 2004. 
97 Duran v. FSA, [2003]  EWCA Civ 1746 (§28).  See L. Edwards, “Taking the “Personal” Out of 
Personal Data: Duran v. FSA and its Impact on Legal Regulation of CCTV”, SCRIPT-ed, 1(2), 
2004 http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/durant.asp 
98 Article 8 The processing of special categories of data: 
1. Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing 
of data concerning health or sex life.  
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where: 
(a) the data subject has given his explicit consent to the processing of those data, except where the 
laws of the Member State provide that the prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted 
by the data subject's giving his consent; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and specific rights of 
the controller in the field of employment law in so far as it is authorized by national law providing 
for adequate safeguards; or 
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another person 
where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent; or 
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate guarantees by 
a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a political, philosophical, 
religious or trade-union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members of 
the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that' 
the data are not disclosed to a third party without the consent of the data subjects; or 
(e) the processing relates to data which are manifestly made public by the data subject or is 
necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.  
3.Paragraph 1 shall not apply where processing of the data is required for the purposes of 
preventive medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the management of 
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questions with regards to some of the potential AmI applications, as the 
intervention of information technologies may alter the ‘nature’ of the data 
involved. Images of persons unavoidably provide information about their racial or 
ethnic origin; profiling of persons on the basis of their preferred entertainment 
programs in a context of interactive web TV may carry indications about those 
persons’ political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs; tracking of 
consumers’ choices in a supermarket may reveal sensitive aspects of their private 
life: a specific diet may indicate religious beliefs, buying drugs (supermarkets 
increasingly sell health products and medicines) may indicate one’s health status, 
etc. 
 
II.2.2. Are the technical visions of AmI compatible with the fundamental 
principles of data protection? 
 
The prospect that ubiquitous, proactive computing systems will ‘spontaneously’ 
respond to individual ‘needs’ in adapting the environment and the 
systemsthemselves without the individual having to decide anything anymore 
about that, and that those systems will become so embedded in daily lives that 
they will literally ‘disappear’ from users’ consciousness99, so that individuals will 
not even necessarily be conscious of their presence, promises important 
disturbances for our perception and implementation of individual informational 
rights and data controllers’ responsibilities.  
Article 6 of the Directive 95/46/EC specifies the requirements relating to 
the data quality: 
                                                                                                                                     
health-care services, and where those data are processed by a health professional subject under 
national law or rules established by national competent bodies to the obligation of professional 
secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent obligation of secrecy.  
4. Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons of substantial 
public interest, lay down exemptions in addition to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by 
national law or by decision of the supervisory authority.  
5. Processing of data relating to offences, criminal convictions or security measures may be 
carried out only under the control of official authority, or if suitable specific safeguards are 
provided under national law, subject to derogations which may be granted by the Member State 
under national provisions providing suitable specific safeguards. However, a complete register of 
criminal convictions may be kept only under the control of official authority. 
Member States may provide that data relating to administrative sanctions or judgements in civil 
cases shall also be processed under the control of official authority.  
6. Derogations from paragraph I provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be notified to the 
Commission  
Member States shall determine the conditions under which a national identification number or any 
other identifier of general application may be processed.  
99 Mark Weiser, “Computer Science Problems in Ubiquitous Computing”, Commun., ACM 36, 
ACM Press, 1993, 7: 75-84. 
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1.Member States shall provide that personal data must be:  
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; 
(b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a 
way incompatible with those purposes. Further processing of data for historical, statistical 
or scientific purposes shall not be considered as incompatible provided that Member 
States provide appropriate safeguards; 
(c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are 
collected and/or further processed; 
(d) accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must be taken to 
ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for 
which they were collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified; 
(e) kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is 
necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected or for which they are further 
processed. Member States shall lay down appropriate safeguards for personal data stored 
for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use.  
2.It shall be for the controller to ensure that paragraph 1 is complied with. 
According to the requirements relating to data quality thus, personal data 
must be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not further 
processed in a way incompatible with those purposes. How can the legitimacy of 
the undescribed finality of the data processing, and the compatibility of further 
uses of the data with those initial finalities be assessed even though the 
technology may give birth to indeterminate and currently unforeseeable 
applications and although service providers may assume different functions? 
Personal data must be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to 
the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed. The directive 
also requires that processed personal data be accurate and, where necessary, kept 
up to date; and that every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that data which 
are inaccurate or incomplete, having regard to the purposes for which they were 
collected or for which they are further processed, are erased or rectified. Those 
principles are arguably difficult to comply with when the purpose for which the 
data are collected, and for which they may be further processed, are so difficult to 
define a priori as they are in AmI systems. What about that principle of data 
minimization in emerging AmI information systems where, by default, everything 
is recorded? 
Article 7, relating to the criteria for assessing the legitimacy of personal 
data processing reads as follows: 
Member States shall provide that personal data may be processed only if: 
(a) the data subject has unambiguously given his consent; or 
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is 
party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a 
contract; or 
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(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller 
is subject; or 
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject; or 
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom 
the data are disclosed; or 
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by the third party or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where 
such interests are overridden by the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
data subject which require protection under Article 1 (1). 
 
Whenever the technologies involved fade out of the user’s consciousness, 
what happens to the traditional, and legal, requirement that individuals give their 
“informed consent” to any processing of their personal data? Would implicit 
consent, implied from the individual’s use of an infrmation system or acceptance 
of benefits from that system, be enough to protect the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and interests of individuals? What is the impact of the “performativity” 
(such as the impact of autonomic profiling on users’ personality) of technologies 
on the validity of individual consent? 
Further, requirements of the directive regarding transparency of the 
processing of personal data (Article 10 and 11) will not be easy to fulfill either in 
the context of AmI. Article 10 requires the controller or his representative to 
provide a data subject, from whom data relating to himself are collected, with at 
least the following information, except where he already has it: 
(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any;  
(b) the purposes of the processing for which the data are intended;   
(c) any further information such asthe recipients or categories of recipients of the 
data;whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the possible 
consequences of failure to reply;the existence of the right of access to and the right to 
rectify the data concerning him in so far as such further information is necessary, having 
regard to the specific circumstances in which the data are collected, to guarantee fair 
processing in respect of the data subject. 
Article 11 provides that 
where the data have not been obtained from the data subject, Member States shall provide 
that the controller or his representative must at the time of undertaking the recording of 
personal data or if a disclosure to a third party is envisaged, no later than the time when 
the data are first disclosed provide the data subject with at least the following 
information, except where he already has it: 
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(a) the identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
(b) the purposes of the processing; 
(c) any further information such asthe categories of data concerned, the recipients or 
categories of recipients, the existence of the right of access to and the right to rectify the 
data concerning him in so far as such further information is necessary, having regard to 
the specific circumstances in which the data are processed, to guarantee fair processing in 
respect of the data subject. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where, in particular for processing for statistical purposes 
or for the purposes of historical or scientific research, the provision of such information 
proves impossible or would involve a disproportionate effort or if recording or disclosure 
is expressly laid down by law. In these cases Member States shall provide appropriate 
safeguards. 
In sum, invisibility of the terminal in AmI systems, and the inclusion of 
decentralized and multilateral service models, are de facto incompatible with the 
principle of transparency.  
Moreover, the question remains how responsibility could be assigned in a 
system of (human-computer) distributed agency. The recent massive personal data 
losses in the UK and elsewhere, as well as the fact that “biased computer systems 
are instruments of injustice”,100 epitomize the crucial necessity of rethinking 
issues of responsibility in networked digital environments. 
Finally, to the extent that data protection is meant, as it is at least in part, 
to protect people’s privacy, it is necessary for it to be an effective means to indeed 
protect individual privacy, for users to implement the rights provided by the EU 
Data protection scheme, including the rights provided by Article 12 of the 
Directive 95/46/EC. Unfortunately, very few users take the opportunity to 
genuinely control and intervene in the processing of their personal data as the 
European data protection framework allows them to do. One may think of several 
reasons for this.  
First, most peoples’ perceptions of what their right to privacy is about 
correspond to the traditional theories of privacy as protecting intimate and/or 
sensitive information. Information that they do not subjectively perceive as 
intimate and/or sensitive is not, in most persons’ minds, anything that they should 
worry about disclosing or being processed by others. That traditional conception 
does not necessarily fit the new configuration of socio-technical constellations 
involved in an AmI world, where what privacy advocates are worried about is 
collection, use and disclosure of information that is not sensitive nor intimate per 
se, and that is increasingly collected in public. As Nissenbaum relevantly 
                                                 
100 Batya Friedman, Helen Nissenbaum, « Bias in Computer Systems », ACM Transactions on 
Information Systems, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1996, Pages 330 –347. 
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argued101: the challenge that information technology raises for our traditional 
conceptions of privacy results from both the fact that information technologies 
allow the use of information gathered in one specific context to move outside that 
context more easily than ever, and from the ever increasing capacity to aggregate 
(even trivial and non intimate nor sensitive) information about a person to an 
extent that very precise knowledge is gained about that person. 
Another reason why people do not exercise their data protection rights is 
that, in the short term, when disclosing personal data is rewarded with immediate 
utilities, advantage or privileges in their interaction with other agents such as a 
supermarket, a trader or a service supplier on the internet, keeping control of their 
own personal data may appear immaterial to them compared to the immediate and 
tangible advantages of waiving such control. 
That brings us back to an important, yet under discussed issue: the 
normative value of personal information. Can personal information be conceived 
as pure commodity? Or should one acknowledge that personal information is 
among those new “hybrid” objects102 that modernity has produced, half way 
between the category of “subjects” and the category of “objects”, and therefore 
deserving an ad hoc legal status. Such a  legal status would not go as far as 
borrowing the inviolability and inalienability that attach to the rights which 
protect the dignity of human beings, yet cannot be considered either as fully 
alienable commoditized consumption goods. Personal information emanates from, 
and contributes to the formation of individual personality, and has therefore to do 
with human dignity, yet, a person is obviously irreducible to ‘his’ personal 
information, which is  ‘an aspect of the identity’ she ‘projects to the world’, in the 




This article's prospective focus is on two unprecedented challenges brought by the 
announced recent evolution of the information society. First, it argues, data 
mining and profiling processes inherent to the new 'services' offered or to be 
offered to citizens and consumers in the advanced information society, as well as 
the intensification of automated surveillance and scrutiny, may well interfere with 
the individual's self-formation (or subjectivation), chanelling his or her 
behaviours, preferences, thoughts, emotions and choices, and jeopardising their 
                                                 
101 Helen Nissenbaum, “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in 
Public”, Law and Philosophy, 17, 1998, p. 559. 
102 About the modern « hybrids », see Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. Essai 
d’anthropologie symétrique, La Découverte/Poche, 1991. On the idea of ‘incomplete 
commodification’, see Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities, Harvard University Press, 
1996.  
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genuine capacity for individual reflexive self-determination and collective 
deliberation. Second, the article tentatively explores some of the issues that would 
arise from the gradual 'spread' of agency in 'ambient intelligence networks', 
whereas our traditional, and legal, conception of agency presupposes the 
individual human subject to be the exclusive locus of agency. Both of these  
specific challenges concern the more general paradox that whereas the figure of 
the individual, the sovereign subject, autonomous, rational and responsible, is 
considered a 'given', pre-existing reality, a basic unit of neoliberal modes of 
governance, the technological and socio-political developments of the information 
society challenge, quite radically, the classical Enlightenment notion of the 
sovereign subject.  
Having assessed the normative grounds of privacy and data protection, the 
paper has established that those rights are not only valuable for the reason that 
they preserve and/or  advance the interests of the individual rightholders, but also 
have a fundamentally collective, democratic dimension, or a “social-structural” 
value. The right to privacy protects the legal subject’s legitimate interests in 
controlling aspects of his or her identity and personality that he or she projects on 
the world, and in being free from unreasonable constraints on the construction of 
his identity. But the right to privacy also preserves the possibility for the legal 
subject to develop as an autonomous citizen, endowed with the reflexive 
capability needed in order to usefully participate in the processes of deliberative 
democracy; whereas data protection and rules of non disclosure of personal data 
avoid the creation or perpetuation of situations of domination and oppression. The 
collective, social-structural dimension of privacy and data-protection is intimately 
linked with the ‘justiciability’ of knowledge that AmI systems construct over and 
about individuals. 
The role of the law, despite its weakness to address the unprecedented 
challenges that the technical visions of AmI present, is to allow and protect the 
possibility of democratic debates, involving all stakeholders, about the issues 
involved. It is exactly here that the morality of the law resides.103 This may 
require legal intervention to prevent power imbalances among the stakeholders. 
This may also require legal intervention to protect, up to a certain extent, 
                                                 
103 In that sense, see Jacques Derrida, The Force of Law in Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice, Cornell, D, Rosenfield, M and Gray, D (eds), Routledge, 1992. Derrida, like Foucault, 
considers that the law is never impartial but always results from, and carries, strategies of power. 
Yet, where Foucault situates the possibility of resistance within the productive power of 
normativity and governmentality, Derrida argues that the law must be transposed from that sphere 
of normativity and governmentality, where it functions as “droit”, and rethought in relation to an 
impossible justice. See also Margrit Shildrick, “Transgressing the law with Foucault and Derrida: 
some reflections on anomalous embodiment”, Critical Quarterly, Vol. 47, n. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 
30-46. See also Colin Perrin, “The Silent Responsibility of Law”, International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. XI no.31, 1998, 39-47.  
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individual choices and preferences from the tyranny of the majority. The 
European privacy data protection framework also assigns a crucial mandate to the 
law: the mandate of balancing the competing interests at play. In order to fulfill its 
task, the law therefore needs first to have these interests identified and their 
legitimacy assessed.104 An urgent task of the State is to give a voice to the variety 
of stakeholders, identify their respective visions and interests, and organize a 
discussion process to ensure that the information systems remain compatible with 
the democratic character of our society and with the fundamental values attested 
in our attachment to citizens’ fundamental rights and liberties. 
It is the law’s communicative function (which is highly complex, and that 
we have, in this paper, modestly tried to fulfill in part) to create a normative 
framework, a vocabulary to structure normative discussions, as well as institutions 
and procedures that promote further discussion. The law also has a related 
expressive function to clarify which fundamental standards and which values are  
important. Finally, confronted to unprecedented social and political challenges, a 
fundamental role of the law is to evolve so as to ensure that we remain in a free 
and democratic society. The changes needed now are, first, acknowledging the 
inability of law alone to guarantee what really matters about privacy and data 
protection in the context of AmI. Second, ‘delegating’ some of its power to the 
designers of the technologies, who, for a large part, have de facto gained the 
power to shape the infrastructure of the public space.105 Technology designers, as 
well as the industrial sector, should therefore, more than they do today, realize 
how accountable they are towards the general public and towards the democratic 








                                                 
104 Proecedural safeguards, such as the requirements of transparency and accountability are 
obviously insufficient to establish the legitimacy of certain surveillance practices in society, 
especially in the field of law enforcement. (De Hert, P., Gutwirth, S., « Privacy Law, Data 
Protection and Law Enforcement. Opacity of the individual and Transparency of Power”, in. Eric 
Claes and Serge Gutwirth, eds., Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2006, pp.61-101.) 
105 Value sensitive design such as that exhibited in privacy enhancing technologies is indeed much 
encouraged by European policy makers. See for example the Opinion of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor on the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the Council, the European economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
« Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: Steps towards a Policy Framework » 
COM(2007)96. 
44






Agre, P.E,  Rotenberg, M., (eds.), Technology and Privacy. The New Landscape, 
MIT Press, 1998. 
Akrich, M., “The De-Scription of Technological Objects”, in. W.E. Bijker and J.
Law, Shaping Technology / Building Society, MIT Press, 1992. 
Austin, L., “Privacy and the Question of Technology”, Law and Philosophy, 22, 
2003, pp. 119-166. 
Baker, C. E., “Posner’s Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis 
of Law”, Georgia Law Review, 1978, 12(3): 475-496. 
Brin, D., Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to Choose Between 
Privacy and Freedom?, Perseus Books Group, 1999. 
Callon, M.,  “Les réesaux sociaux à l’aune de la théorie de l’acteur-réseau”, 
Sociologies Pratiques, n.13, pp. 37-43, 2006.  
Campbell, A.V., “The Ethical Challenges of Genetic Databases: Safeguarding 
Altruism and Trust”, King’s Law Journal, 2007, 18, pp. 227-245: 241. 
Cohen, J.E., « Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Je rey 
Rosen », Georgetown Law Journal, 2001, 89 : 2029-2045. 
Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Committee (USA) Guidelines for 
Public Videosurveillance: A guide to Protecting Communities and 
Preserving Civil Liberties, 2007, 
       www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Video_surveillance_guidelines.pdf. 
Custers, B., The Power of Knowledge, Ethical, Legal, and technological Aspects 
of Data Mining and Group Profiling in Epidemiology, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2004. 
De Hert, P., Gutwirth, S., « Privacy Law, Data Protection and Law Enforcement. 
Opacity of the individual and Transparency of Power”, in. Eric Claes and 
Serge Gutwirth, eds.,Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2006, 
pp.61-101. 
Dempsey, J.X., Rubinstein, I., “Lawyers and Technologists. Joined at Hips?”, 
IEEE Security and Privacy, May/June 2006, pp. 15-19.  
Derrida, J., “The Force of Law” in Cornell, D, Rosenfield, M and Gray, D (eds), 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, Routledge, 1992.  
Dewey, J., “Liberalism and Civil Liberties”, in Boydston, J A (ed.), John Dewey: 
The Later Works, 1925-1953 : 1938/Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Vol. 12, , 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1991. 
Dinant, J.-M., Lazaro, C., Lefever, N., Poullet,Y., Rouvroy, A., “L'application de 
la Convetion 108 au mécanisme de profilage”, Report for the Council of 
Europe, 2007. 
Dworkin, G., The Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988. 
45
Rouvroy: Privacy and Ambient Intelligence
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
 
 
Edwards, L., “Taking the “Personal” Out of Personal Data: Duran v. FSA and its 
Impact on Legal Regulation of CCTV”, SCRIPT-ed, 1(2), 2004 
http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/issue2/durant.asp (accessed on 
January 25, 2008). 
Epstein, R., “Deconstructing Privacy and Putting it Back together Again”, Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 2000, 17(2), p. 22. 
Epstein, R., “How Much Privacy Do We Really Want?”, Hoover Digest, 2002.  
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission),  
Opinion on videosurveillance in public places by public authorities and the 
protection of Human Rights, of 23 March 2007 (Study No. 404/2006), CDL-
AD(2007)014, http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2007/CDL-AD(2007)014-
e.pdf 
European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
« Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) in Europe: Steps towards a Policy 
Framework » COM(2007)96. 
European Network of Excellence FIDIS (Future of Identity in the Information 
Society)’s study on “Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), Profiling, and 
Ambient Intelligence (AmI)”, 
        http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/fidis-wp7-
del7.7.RFID_Profiling_AMI.pdf 
Faiden, R., Beauchamps, T., A, History and Theory of Informed Consent, Oxford 
University Press, 1986. 
Farnsworth, W.,  “The Taste for Fairness”, Columbia Law Review, 2002, 102, 
pp. 1998-2010. 
Fisk, C. L., “Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership 
of Human Capital”, Connecticut Law Review, 2002, p. 34 : 765-782 
Flemming, J.E., “Securing Deliberative Autonomy”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 
48, N.1, 1995, pp. 1-71.  
Flemming, J.E., “Securing Deliberative Democracy”, Fordham Law Review, 
Vol. 72, p. 1435, 2004.  
Foucault,M., L'herméneutique du sujet, Cours du collège de France,1981-1982, 
Seuil / Gallimard, 2001. 
Franko Aas, K., “ ‘The body does not lie’ : Identity, risk and trust in 
technoculture”, Crime, Media, Culture, 2006, 2(2) :143-158. 
Fried, Ch., “Privacy: a moral analysis.”, Yale Law Journal, 1968, 77, pp. 475-93. 
Friedewald, M., Vildjiounaite, E., Punie, Y., and Wright, D., “Privacy, identity 
and security in ambient intelligence: A scenario analysis.”, Telematics and 
Informatics, 2007, 24(1), p.15. 
Friedman, L.,  Law and Society. An Introduction, Prentice Hall, 1977. 
46




Friedman, B., Nissenbaum, H, « Bias in Computer Systems », ACM 
Transactions on Information Systems, Vol. 14, No. 3, July 1996, Pages 330 
–347. 
Gavison, R., “Privacy and the Limits of Law” in Schoeman, F D (ed.),  
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: an Antology,  Cambridge University 
Press, 1984.  
Gilliom, J., Overseers the Poor, Chicago University Press, 2001. 
Goldman, E., « Search Engine Biases and the Demise of Search Engine 
Utopianism », Yale Law Journal of Technology, 2006, 188-200. 
Gutwirth, S.,  De Hert, P., “Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. 
Opacity of the individual and transparency of power”, in Claes, E., Duff, D. 
and Gutwirth, S., Privacy and the Criminal Law, Intersentia, 2006.  
Habermas, J., Between Facts and Norms, MIT Press, 1996. 
Hacking, I., “Making Up People”, London Review of Books, 26(16), 17 August 
2006. 
Haraway, D. J., Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millenium. 
FemaleMan\_Meets\_OncoMouse: Feminism and Technoscience, 
Routledge, 1997. 
Hardt, M. et Negri, A., Multitude. Guerre et démocratie à l’âge de l’empire, La 
Découverte, 2004. 
Hildebrandt, M., “Profiles and Correlatable Humans”, in: Henning, Ch., Stehr, 
N. and Weiler, B., (eds.), Knowledge and the Law. Can Knowledge be Made 
Just?, New Jersey: Transaction Books 2007. 
Hilty et al.,The Precautionary Principle in the Information Society – Effects of 
Pervasive Computing on Health and Environment, Swiss Center for 
Technology Assessment (TA-SWISS), Bern (TA46e/2005).  
IBM, Autonomic computing manifesto. 
        http://www.research.ibm.com/autonomic/manifesto/ 
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies – Joint Research centre, Security 
and Privacy for the Citizen in the Post-September 11 Digital Age. A 
prospective overview. Report to the European Parliament Committee on 
Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), July 
2003, IPTS Technical Reports Series, EUR 20823 EN, 97. 
Jacobs, A.,  “The benefits of The Legal Analytic Perspective For esigners of 
Context-Aware Technologies”, 
        http://guir.berkeley.edu/pubs/ubicomp2002/privacyworkshop/ (accessed on 
January 25, 2008) 
Jasanoff, S., States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social 
Order, Routledge, 2004. 
Kronman, A.T., “Paternalism and the Law of Contracts”, Yale Law Journal, 
1983,  92, p. 770. 
47
Rouvroy: Privacy and Ambient Intelligence
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
 
 
Latour, B.,  Nous n’avons jamais été modernes. Essai d’anthropologie 
symétrique, La Découverte/Poche, 1991.  
Latour, B., Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, 
Oxford University Press, 2005. 
Lefebvre, H., The Production of Space, Blackwell, 1991. 
Lessig, L., “The Architecture of Privacy”, Vanderbilt Entertainment Law and 
Practice, 1, 1999 
Lessig, L., Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Basic Books, 1999. 
Lyon, D., The Electronic Eye: the Rise of Surveillance Society, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1994. 
McGrath, J.E., Loving Big Brother: Performance, Privacy, and Surveillance 
Space, Routledge, 2004. 
Mill, J.S., On Libety, Cambridge University Press, 1989 [1859]. 
Miller, T., “Testimony on Genetic privacy, before the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution on genetic privacy”, September 12, 2002. 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/miller091202.htm#_edn11> 
Mumford, L., « Authoritarian and Democratic Technics », Technology and 
Culture, 5(1), 1964, 1-8. 
Nickel, R., “Jürgen Habermas’ concept of co-originality in times of globalization 
and the militant security state”, IUE Working Paper Law, 2006/27. 
Nissenbaum, H., “Protecting Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of 
Privacy in Public”, Law and Philosophy, 17, 1998, p. 559. 
O’Neill, O., Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Gifford Lectures, 2001), 
Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Extending 
Opportunities: How Active Social Policy Can Benefit Us All, OECD, 2005. 
Perri6, Private Life and Public Policy in The future of Privacy: Public Trust in 
the Use of Private Information v. 2, Lasky, K and Fletcher, A (eds), Demos 
Medical Publishing, 1998.  
Perrin, C., “The Silent Responsibility of Law”, International Journal for the 
Semiotics of Law / Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique Vol. XI 
no.31, 1998, 39-47. 
Planetary Collegium / Montreal 2007 Summit, “Reviewing the Future: Vision, 
Innovation, emergence”, 19-22 April 2007 http://summit.planetary-
collegium.net/abstracts.html 
Posner, R. A., “An Economic theory of Privacy” in Schoeman, F. D.,  (ed.), 
Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, Cambridge University 
Press, 1984.  








Poullet,Y., Rouvroy, A., Darquennes, D., « Le droit à la rencontre des 
technologies de l’information et de la communication : le cas du RFID », 
Cahiers droits, science et technologie, CNRS, forthcoming 2008.  
Poullet, Y., Dinant, J-M., “The internet and private life in Europe: Risks and 
aspirations”, in.  New Dimentions of Privacy Law, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 60-90. 
PRIAM (privacy issues in ambient intelligence) project funded by the French 
INRIA.http://priam.citi.insa-
lyon.fr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=26 
Radin, M.J., Contested Commodities, Harvard University Press, 1996.  
Rosanvallon, P., La nouvelle question sociale. Repenser l’État providence, Seuil, 
1995. 
Rosen, J. The Naked Crowd: Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious 
Age, Random House Trade Paperback, 2005. 
Rouvroy, A., Poullet, Y., « The right to informational self-determination and the 
value of self-development. Reassessing the importance of privacy for 
democracy. », in Reinventing Data-Protection ?, proceedings of the 
International Conference held in Brussels, 12-13 October 2007, Springer 
(forthcoming). 
Rouvroy, A.,Human Genes and Neoliberal Governance: A Foucauldian 
Critique. Abingdon [England] & New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008.  
Schoeman, F., Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984. 
Schwartz, P.M., “Beyond Lessig’s Code for internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, 
Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices”, Wisconsin Law Review, 
2000, 743-788. 
Schwartz, P.M., Treanor, W.M., “The New Privacy”, Michigan Law Review, 
2003, 101. 
Shildrick, M.,  “Transgressing the law with Foucault and Derrida: some 
reflections on anomalous embodiment”, Critical Quarterly, Vol. 47, n. 3, 
Autumn 2005, pp. 30-46.  
Skordas, T. and Metakides, G., “Major Challenges in Ambient Intelligence”, 
Studies in Informatics and Control, 12(2), June 2003. 
Solove, D., Rotenberg, M., and Schwartz, P.M., Privacy, Information and 
Technology,  Aspen Publishers, 2006. 
Solove, D., The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age, 
NYU Press, 2006.  
Spiekermann, S., Pallas, F., “Technology paternalism – wider implications of 




Rouvroy: Privacy and Ambient Intelligence
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
 
 
Spielmann, D., “Jurisprudence des jurisdictions de Strasbourg et de Luxembourg 
dans le domaine des droits de l’homme: conflits, incohérences et 
complémentarités”, in. Alston P. (ed.), L’Union Européenne et des Droits de 
l’Homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001. 
Strahilevitz, L.J., “Privacy versus Antidiscrimination”, Chicago Law & 
Economics Working Paper, No. 349 (2D Series), July 2007. 
Suchman, L., Human-Machine Reconfigurations : Plans and Situated Actions, 
Cambridge University Press, 2d.ed., 2006. 
SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of Ambient Intelligence) project, pubished as 
Wright, David, Serge Gutwirth, Michael Friedewald et al., Safeguards in a 
World of Ambient Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht, 2008.  
TAUCIS (Technology Assessment of Ubiquitous Computing and Informational 
Self-Determination) project, funded by the German Federal Ministery for 
Education and Research, http://www.taucis.hu-
berlin.de/content/de/ueberblick/english.php,  
Warren, S., Brandeis, L., “The Right to Privacy”, Harv. L. Rev. 1890. 
Wei, S.X.,  “Poetics of performative space”, AI & Society, 21(4), June 2007.  
Weiser, M., “Computer Science Problems in Ubiquitous Computing”, Commun., 
ACM 36, ACM Press, 1993, 7, pp. 75-84. 
Werbach, K.D., “Sensors and Sensibilities”, Cardozo Law Review, 2007, 28(5) : 
2321-2372. 
Westin, A.F., Privacy and Freedom, Athenaeum, 1967. 
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data (Group 29),    Working document on data protection issues 
related to RFID technology, WP 105, of 19th January 2005, 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf  
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data (Group 29),    Opinion on the concept of personal data, WP 
136 of 20th June 2007, 
     http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf 
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data (Group 29), Results of the Public Consultation on Article 29 
Working Document 105 on Data Protection Issues Related to RFID 
Technology, of 28th June 2005, 
     http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp111_en.pdf 
Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data (Group 29),    Opinion 5/2004 on unsolicited communications 









Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of 
Personal Data (Group 29),    Opinion on the Processing of Personal Data by 
means of Video Surveillance of 11th February 2004, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp67_en.pd
f 
Wright, R.W., “The Principles of Justice”, Notre Dame Law Review, 2000, 75, p. 
1859. 
Wright, D., Gutwirth, S., Friedewald, M. et al.,Safeguards in a World of Ambient 






Rouvroy: Privacy and Ambient Intelligence
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
